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Introduction
The motorbike sped forward unobstructed. It was a fairly straight shot south from
Batticaloa town along the new, smooth road--courtesy of Japanese aid. Small general shops
occasionally clustered along the road, and we passed two high schools and a large Ramakrishna
Mission complex. As we drove along, the buildings became few and far between and one-story
buildings replaced two-story ones.
Three towns and six dusty kilometers later, Kattankudy emerged. Its bustle and prosperity
came into view with two--sometimes even three--story buildings. This wasn't the only thing that
distinguished this town from its surroundings. A row of sculpted date-tree statues increased in
height as they led up to a towering welcome sign spanning the width of the divided highway.
Planted date palms adorned the median.
"See, this is what they have put. Trees only. That's it," Mr. Vignesh called back to me as
he drove.
But the trees weren't actually the only thing that decorated the town. We passed three
large roundabouts decorating the western side, and rows of neatly-kept shops interspersed with
beautifully decorated mosques, a few municipal buildings with bulbous domes and minarets and
Islamic schools with the names written in Arabic. Most women were wearing burqas with niqab
in a sleek black color. Signs less grand than the welcome board continued to overarch the road,
uniting the divided north and south paths. Bright green 'Etisalat'-sponsoredbus stops speckled
each side and occasionally there were political billboards with promises to develop the Muslim
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community.1 This place looked like nothing I had ever seen in Sri Lanka, or in South India for
that matter--it felt like a different world.
Abruptly, a gold statue confronted us. It was Swami Vivekanandataking a step forward
towards Kattankudy with a somber expression.2 The trees had stopped, and I knew we must have
reached Araiyampathy. Mr. Vignesh immediately turned east along the boundary road between
these two towns. He had been showing me infamous "border towns" throughout the day because
these sites appear regularly in the news for land disputes.3
As we continued down this boundary road, he said, "That [northern] side is Muslim. This
[southern] side is Tamil. See how they have constructed walls like this?"
I confess that at the time I thought that I had. Nonetheless, after spending the next four
months living there--two of those on that very road--I soon realized that there was nothing
peculiar about the "walls" of houses here. In fact, this boundary was in many ways constructed
negatively. Empty lots, a bus stand, a dumping ground, and some abandoned army checkpoint
buildings occupied a lot of this space. Many people had fled this area because of the war and
some were just starting to move back in. Particularly on the northern (Muslim) side of this road
where population pressures were greater, many had recently built their houses and moved there.
Fascinated by these trees, I found myself two months later engaged in an interesting
discussion with Kattankudy political campaign worker, Mr. Ajmal.

1

Etisalat is a multinational telecommunications corporation based in UAE. This is a popular choice for phone and
internet plans among the Muslim community in Kattankudy.
2
Swami Vivekananda is a renouncer, sage, and spiritual teacher from India who followed in the Sri Ramakrishna
movement and supported spiritual and science education and travelled to the West to spread Vedanta philosophy.
3
Arun Tambimutthu, “Araiyampathi pithesathil aththumeeri kaanikalai pidiththavarkalai janaathipathi peci
veliyetruven,” Arayampathy News, Oct. 8, 2013. http://arayampathy.com/news.php?id=2910. See also Bhavani
Fonseka and Mirak Raheem, “Land in the Eastern Province: Politics, Policy, and Conflict,” Center for Policy
Alternatives, May (2010).
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"We [planted the trees] to make the town seem more worthy (aLavu)," Mr. Ajmal said.
"That, and also we cannot keep [things from] another culture here. We may keep [only things
from] this one culture here."
"Another reason for the trees is that they don't have leaves that fall down [onto the road].
If we plant some other trees, the leaves [will be] falling and we [would] have to clean," Shibly
Sir added in English.
"--Yes, yes, they won't fall," Mr. Ajmal interjected. "But now you are here and you are
going around on this road and that road. It is like [you are] standing still without doing a single
thing or seeing a single problem. But if you want to [learn about] cultural things for Muslims, at
the start, Tamil people thought that Muslims don't have a culture. That is the problem. [Tamils
think Muslims] speak [Tamil] language and repeat [Tamil] culture."4
At first, I chalked up this comment as yet another example of tension and "othering"
tendencies between Tamils and Muslims, perhaps like how Mr. Vignesh saw walls that were not
existent. But, as I listened to this recording many times over, I started to understand the
significance of Mr. Ajmal's comment about Muslim culture--and of that jab at my research
project. Throughout my fieldwork, I occasionally encountered evidence that supported his
accusation that such a "problem"--a discrepancy as to what constitutes Muslim culture--persists
even today. I met two or three (usually elderly) Tamil people who seemed to suggest that there
was no cultural difference between Tamils and Muslims. One woman I met at a Kali Amman
Temple said, "There is no big difference between the Tamils and Muslims. All is one."5 In doing
so, she perhaps contributes subtly to Mr. Ajmal's problem. This thesis traces this "problem" of

4

Mr. Ajmal (teacher and former campaign worker) and Shibly Sir (teacher), recorded interview by author, May 24 th,
2014.
5
“Muslimukkum, Tamilukkum periya vitiyasam onnum illai. Ella onnuthaan.” personal conversation recollected in
field notes, April 27, 2014.
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Muslim and Tamil culture, contextualizing it historically and exploring its material negotiation in
personal and public beautification as technologies of community and of cultural authenticity.
Reaching a Question
About a month after Mr. Vignesh introduced me to the area, my host family found out
about my birthday, and I was obliged to throw a birthday party for my neighbors and friends. I
held it at my house, which was right on the boundary road (Tamil side) at the time. Mr. Vignesh,
his wife Ms. Priya, and their five-year-old daughter Sheshanki were among the thirty or so
people who stopped by to have some snacks and wish me well.
When I visited Ms. Priya later that same week for her birthday, her face became very
animated as she told me of her surprise at seeing life on the boundary road. "Politicians are
always saying this and that. Vignesh and I couldn't believe how it was there. Everyone is always
saying how border town people are suffering. We didn't know how they lived there. We were so
shocked, Kem. Vignesh and I talked for an hour [about it] after we got back. Everyone was so
friendly."6
Mr. Vignesh and Ms. Priya are both wealthy and educated lecturers at Eastern University
who live with their daughter on an affluent street in Kallady, just south of the main Batticaloa
town. Mr. Vignesh lecturers in Management and Tourism while Ms. Priya lectures in
Economics and Poverty. They wouldn't have had much occasion to visit the boundary road
because they didn't have relatives in either village. As Ms. Priya noted above, they had a lot of
preconceived notions about what locals sometimes refer to as "border towns," and these notions
were fueled by local politicians who are popularly blamed for polarizing ethnic politics in order
to secure specific vote banks.

6

Ms. Priya, personal conversation recollected in field notes, April 20, 2014.
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So, without reflecting on the fact that the walls of his own large house were built much
higher, Mr. Vignesh had made the assumption when showing me around that first day that
'boundary people' would be trying to shut the ethnic "other" out of their homes. Instead, what he
and Ms. Priya saw at my birthday party was much different from this imagined ethnic isolation.
For Ms. Priya and Mr. Vignesh, whose relatives and closest friends are Tamil, whose neighbors
are Tamil, and whose high social status as wealthy professors that increases their access to oftenpolarizing political circles, Tamils had not only little incentive to socialize with Muslim people,
but also little opportunity. Before visiting my Akka's house on the boundary road, they had
assumed that ethnic differences would prevent even basic friendly neighborly interaction.
To their great surprise, Raji Akka, my host elder-sister, had many friends and
acquaintances across the street. I had also made new friends on both sides of the street. As a
result, Tamil Hindus, Tamil Christians, and Muslims all came to my party and shared the small
space of my Akka's TV-room intermittently on that 16th of April. The celebration of a foreign
lady's 21st birthday (called "Key Birthday") is by all accounts a peculiar event negotiated by my
presence. However, when Raji Akka was showing me her photo albums, I saw that her son,
Prajit, also had birthday parties with "diverse" crowds--meaning that they included neighbors
from across the street.
In many ways, if I was "looking" for anything when I first came to live on boundary road,
it was this: neighborly interaction overcoming the normative and now infamous Tamil-Muslim
ethnic dichotomy. For an ethnographer, there should always be an evolution of objectives as her
understanding of a place develops. Ethnographers tend to set out without many specific questions
at all and 'stumble upon' new ones that ultimately challenge the assumptions that had brought her
to a locality in the first place. Having heard ample rumors about Muslim-Tamil tensions, I
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wanted to "prove" that these notions were wrong and explore how the agency in shared space
and neighborliness could overcome ethnic stereotypes and long-term prejudices.
In retrospect, I recognize that such a project is clearly impossible to do in four months.
However, in the two months I spent living directly on this boundary road and an additional two
months living only two lanes away, I can say that any notion of a strict social binary as imagined
by Mr. Vignesh and Ms. Priya--who are, significantly, not alone in this imagination--is false, if
extremely complicated. Much like anywhere, it is neither a place of happy and carefree friends
nor a place of cold and bitter enemies. I regularly witnessed people exchange friendly
conversation while passing each other on the street and then in the same day participate in
slanderous and ethnically-charged rumors. And, of course, residents sling similar gossips and
rumors at people belonging to the same normative ethnic community. People negotiate ethnic
difference and neighborliness in extremely complicated and often contradictory ways. I
remember being bitterly shocked when a couple of my Muslim friends joined their neighbor in
denouncing all Tamils as 'LTTE' after having just enjoyed my Akka's hospitality not even thirty
minutes prior.
In this thesis, therefore, I hope to explore the tensions of everyday experiences to show
that these same people often simultaneously participate in, contradict, reinforce, complicate,
create, and imagine new ethnic stereotypes for complex reasons. I have chosen to focus on a
study of ornament and beauty in border towns. In spite of Mr. Vignesh's stated indifference, then,
this thesis focuses in some ways on those very "trees." I argue that the trees and similar material
"ornaments" have a profound impact on negotiations of "cultural authenticity," and contiguously,
notions of religious and ethnic otherness. Ultimately, beautification and ornamentation are
entangled within and constitutive of the deeply intricate webs of daily life negotiated both
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materially and immaterially. For the purposes of this paper, I am situating ornament and public
beautification in local histories of population settlement and contested land in the light of postwar development, disparate distributions of economic and political power, and debates between
and within local religious communities. I argue that these conditions foster a greater imperative
to ornament, which, perhaps, sustains a tension of peaceful exchanges across certain
communities and is rejected, sometimes violently, in others. I argue that beauty and ornament,
therefore, must be contextualized in local negotiations of wider institutional and ideological
developments, and I conceive of these developments as being in many ways inseparable from
their material negotiations in ornament and beauty.
Methodology
I spent about four months living in the Batticaloa District in the two towns mentioned in
the introduction: Araiyampathy (a Tamil majority town) and Kattankudy (a 100% Muslim town).
I lived on Araiyampathy-Tamil side of the boundary road dividing these two towns for about 2
months, and I spent the next two months in Kattankudy--just a few lanes away from this
boundary road. I was able to speak with some local elders, government officials, and other fairly
prominent community members (periya akkal, "big people," in spoken form) within my network
to gain a sense of the area and the interaction between these villages. These people most
commonly were connections I made through my host families and friends. I also made some
connections through University of Peradeniya and Eastern University Faculty. I also incorporate
visual and translated written materials and from websites, flyers, posters, news articles, and local
publications.
My "orientation" to living in these border towns provides a practical/expedient
framework for understanding some of these lived negotiations of ethnic and religious
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differentiation. On my very first day, an elderly neighbor came to meet me. I greeted her with
what I considered to be a respectful and conventional--if a bit formal--greeting saying
"Vannakkam, Amma."7 She warmly by sternly told me that she was not my 'Amma' but rather
my 'Umma,' as 'Mother' is called in the Muslim dialect. She added that I should also address her
saying "Assalamu Walaikkum," not "Vannakkam." I could say the latter to Tamil people like my
host Akka, who was smiling and nodding all the while. Like this, my Aunties, Uncles,
U/Ammas, Akkas, friends, and even my 4-year-old little brother took it upon themselves to
explain to me how life was there. When my friends would elaborate on some gossip or
stereotype or the like, they often framed their discussion in light of the fact that I was often
viewed as an innocent girl who didn't know about how things were. My new friends and family
were unbelievably patient in explaining things and quick to forgive my oversights. Nonetheless, I
often found myself swept up in the middle of these negotiations facing differing opinions as to
when I was expected to participate and when I shouldn't.
This brings to the fore an imperative methodological point in ethnography: the extent of
my presence negotiating interactions and responses. I make absolutely no pretenses to a "fly on
the wall" methodology. I recognize that my presence as a foreigner was a crucial element
negotiating the relationships that I participated in and witnessed. Moreover, the home I was
staying in and the people I associated with also impacted my identity and subsequently people's
comments to me and around me.8 I not only kept this fact ever-present in my mind, but I also
embraced it. Being an "outsider" had some advantages. People often felt very free to explain

7

This literally means “Hello, Mother.” “Vannakkam” is used in more traditional or formal situations and to convey
respect. “Amma” can be used in the familiar and respectful sense of “Aunty.”
8
Especially when I switched homestays for personal reasons from staying with a Tamil family to a Muslim family, I
experienced a lot of confusion from my older friends and acquaintances. Some people restrained their conversation
with me while others spoke more freely. Some were visibly much colder to me, while others saw this as a natural
step towards Islam.
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things to me since they often saw me as comparatively unconnected with people and places
locally.9 Throughout the course of my stay, I also found my own body being a very real site
where these negotiations were played out. How I wore my shawl was a political act, what I
decorated my nails with had the potential to be fashion or even haram, and wearing saree could
be praised as traditional or deemed inappropriate. For example, my Aunty and Muslim friends
encouraged me to wear my shawl by spreading out so that it covered my arms. On one occasion
when I forgot this, my Aunty stopped me and pulled my shawl down.
While a material culture approach has the advantage of grounding this paper in a more
visual idiom, I also, recognize the central importance of language. Language limitations are, of
course, a very real factor in this project. On a daily basis, I attempted to overcome language
barriers by asking multiple and repetitive questions. Additionally, I have a sense that my friends
and family often simplified the explanations they offered me, though they were very patient
whenever I asked them to repeat something they said or to explain a word. At the beginning I
tried using two translators, but I ultimately found it easier and more practical to conduct
interviews without them.10 One of my close contacts, Shibly Sir, also regularly helped me by
both arranging interviews with local politicians and offering translations on the spot. Whenever
appropriate, I recorded formal interviews to refer back and listen to them.11 I am also grateful to

9

When it came to global issues such as the then-current US-UN discussion to hold the Sri Lankan government
accountable for war crimes, I found that my identity as an American more significantly impacted conversations.
Also, on the few occasions when I was accompanied by a Tamil guide to Muslim places, they would change my
nationality to “Australian” or “UK” when introducing me to Muslims because they foresaw my “Americanness” as a
conversation-stopper. Ultimately I didn’t find this necessary or honest. I tried not to condone this, but sometimes I
felt obliged to let it slide rather than contradict my contacts in public. Later I at least came to understand the
rationale for this when I saw a local protest for Gaza where American and Israeli flags were burned.
10
The translators recommended to me were fantastic, and I loved spending time with them. However, there were
ample problems coordinating times and sometimes they didn’t feel comfortable interviewing people of a different
ethnicity. They also tended to interject with leading questions and sometimes drastically shaped responses.
11
I also secured explicit permission for formal interviews and recordings either by reading verbatim from a consent
form [see appendix], by summarizing it, or letting others read it.
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Dr. Vasu Renganathan, who has helped me translate portions of these and revised some of my
translations of written sources. Some interviews were in English.12
Public Modalities
When conceiving of 'public' in this thesis, I primarily borrow the metaphor of public
"modalities" from Daniel Brouwer and Robert Asen. This has many advantages as an inclusive,
fluid, process-oriented conception that "foregrounds productive arts of crafting publicity."13
Brouwer and Asen understand modality as the manner in which people engage with, construct,
and understand the world, whether they be a subject or a scholar. "Modality's 'manner' implicates
practice and theory, referring both to ways that social actors engage others publicly and to ways
that scholars study processes of public engagement.”14 Importantly, they underline how mode
helps us "appreciate that how we proceed in an activity shapes the activity itself.”15 Brouwer and
Asen illustrate the critical potential for a concept of "modalities" by comparing it to the rhetorical
tradition of "techne." Both, they explain, constitute "neither an inherently emancipatory process
nor a reactionary process.”16 By conceiving of the public in terms of modalities, we can focus on
the public as constant negotiation. In doing so, things like social norms and values become
tangible and inescapably rooted in everyday engagements rather than existing in an elevated and
elusive realm. With this broad and fluid conception of the "public," I consider as 'publicconstructing' many unconventional modes such as rumors and gossips, memory, emotion,
imagination, media and the news, and aesthetics. Using the metaphor of modalities also
encourages the use of overlapping and simultaneous public modes. Take for example, a Hindu

12

I conducted 45 formal interviews, 35 of which are recorded, 26 of which are transcribed in English at least in part.
Daniel C. Brouwer and Robert Asen, Public Modalities: Rhetoric, Culture, Media, and the Shape of Public Life
(University of Alabama Press, 2010), 16.
14
Ibid., 16.
15
Ibid., 19.
16
Ibid., 21.
13
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temple festival. This involves the 'public space' of a temple itself; however, festivals--like in
most places in South Asia--have a regular tendency to spill out and subsume the surrounding
streets, temporarily expanding and/or making visible a community's space. The rituals at the
temple itself are of course performed with large audiences. Many people gather before, during,
and after the temple functions and chat, gossip, anticipate, and discuss the events together. They
also appear on the news or in local gossips or personal photos if one doesn't physically go to a
festival space. The metaphor of "modalities," therefore, permits these sorts of creative and salient
conceptualizations of publics.
"Feminine" Modalities and the Everyday
Essentially, then, I conceive of a 'public' as inseparable from everyday life and the
(especially local) practices that comprise it. Conceiving of a public as an amorphous and
constantly-negotiated construction should not obscure the important fact that such constructions
tend to, at a given time, exist in particular patterns, routines, and idioms. The everyday "spans
consciousness and unconsciousness and grants people the opportunity to interact with one
another in lives that are more or less effective.”17 The everyday therefore involves differing
levels of attention and different gazes that privilege certain means of performance over others.
David Morgan extends this temporal conception of the everyday by highlighting that what
everyday performances makes us forget is just as important as what they bring to our attention.
Even if people choose to affirm or support "top-down" ideas and identities, they must then
confront and construct--consciously or subconsciously--what those ideas and identities will look
like when they wake up each morning and prepare breakfast, when they walk down the main
road to the store, and when they interact with their neighbors, friends, and family. It is in daily
17

David Morgan, Visual Piety: A History of Theory and Popular Images. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1998), 15.
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life that people--individuals and communities--must negotiate their realities and personhood
through practices, interactions, and relationships. I argue that understanding ethnicity
necessitates the close appreciation of the mundane--food, clothes, and gossips. Interestingly, it is
precisely these sorts of constructors of reality and personhood that are often conceived of as
'feminine.'
Recognizing the marginalization of feminized public modalities in popular discourse on
the ground, I argue that 'public' should be broadened whenever possible to be inclusive of more
people—namely, people who are typically considered 'apolitical,' especially women. To deny
these sorts of modalities their due acknowledgment is to impose normative misogynist notions of
power, politics, and religion onto vibrant, diverse, creative, and powerful agents of society. I do
not mean to minimize the problem of women's exclusion from these more 'normative' types of
publics. Rather, I seek to challenge the agency and scope of these exclusive publics and show
how everyday actions negotiate and reconstruct these publics. I am not arguing for the
significance of beauty and ornament over other technologies and modalities. I am simply calling
for more attention to traditionally marginalized, though increasingly popular, academic
exploration. Instead of focusing on politically and economically powerful elites—and in doing so
replicating these hierarchies and structural inequalities in scholarship—scholars are in a position
to pay attention to voices and technologies typically considered outside of traditionally
hegemonic public modalities.
Beauty and Ornament: Contextualized Material Culture Approach
I use ethnographic methods with a primarily material culture approach to understand
questions of Tamil and Muslim ethnicity in Eastern Sri Lanka and how individuals and
communities embody their pasts and futures in the present. I use a material culture approach to
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this subject to highlight beautification and ornamentation (1) as particular visual and spatial
idioms with locally negotiated meanings and expectations and (2) to posture these idioms as
local constructs that suggest 'dialogue' and 'exchange' rather than simply as 'othering.' I also find
a materially and spatially-oriented approach to be extremely productive in illuminating salient
memories of history and notions of authenticity.
With this approach, I admittedly have a broad conception of both "beauty" and
"ornament" that spans from bodies to spaces. I do not mean "ornamentation" to suggest
decoration, though the ornaments I discuss are importantly recognized as being decorative and
beautiful, sometimes even as their sole function. Arthur Danto writes that "Theories of taste,
however, are not matters of taste: they bring with them entire philosophies of conduct and of
life....So, the absence or presence of ornament always transcends questions of aesthetics alone."18
In this thesis I show how "ornament" is a subtle yet significant former of place, person, and
community. Some scholars describe similar conceptions as vernacular--or, I prefer, an embodied
and emplaced idiom. Ornamentation is significantly not codified but fluid and under constant
renegotiation. Nonetheless, ornamentation is salient. People use the idiom of ornamentation all
the time. It is something wanted by many people here, whether individually or in aggregate. To
quote Jordan Sand in Tokyo Vernacular:
Every city also has its own vernacular: a language of form, space, and sensation shaped
by the local history of habitation. Newcomers encounter a city's vernacular in a torrent of
signals demanding interpretation. Occupants, by contrast, apprehend the city's vernacular
intuitively, navigating it without needing to bring it to consciousness. The landscape of
the vernacular city is a fabric continually being woven. Threads of the past cross with
new ones. The individual threads tend to be invisible, except at the margins or in the

18

Arthur Danto, “Beauty and Beautification,” in Beauty Matters, Edited by Peg Zeglin Brand. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000, 77.
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interstices of the larger pattern. As a generative grammar rather than a fixed tradition, the
vernacular incorporates modern buildings and products of mass culture.19
I argue that ornamentation in Eastern Sri Lanka can and should be considered in this
sense of a "generative grammar" of visual idioms operating via road, ritual, architecture, home,
and body. However, unlike Sand, I do not see this 'generative grammar' or 'vernacular' as
necessarily "opposed" to a normative cosmopolitan standard. I see it is as, rather, a rejection of
such a standard. It is an inevitable mediation by virtue of our fundamental embodiment.
Concerning the idioms of beautification and ornamentation, my fieldwork shows that
what is at stake locally is not necessarily some strange and unique phenomena. In fact,
ornamentation is subtle in spite of its frequent garishness. Whether it be nail polish or statues on
government land, the people I spoke with about beautification projects more often than not
expressed a nonchalant indifference towards them. They would often provide short and
apparently self-evident answers or start talking about other subjects. I argue that this is
significant: a paradox of a relative silence on what—by many accounts—is a loud visual
presence. It is significant that people pay little attention to these participants in their
communities, merely assuming them to be a part of their culture. Miller argues that the "less we
are aware of [things], the more powerfully they can determine our expectations."20 Take for
example the trees and statues mentioned above. As locals take the bus to work in the morning or
go shopping in the evening, these public beautification projects are ever-present in the periphery.
It is, as Justin McDaniel puts it, quite literally "on-the-way" learning.21
In this way, I argue that beautification and ornamentation can be conceived of as
'technologies' in both an emic and etic sense with the power to construct and normalize a
19

Jordan Sand, Tokyo Vernacular: Common Spaces, Local Histories, and Found Objects. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2013), 2-3.
20
Daniel Miller, Stuff. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 50.
21
Forthcoming, Buddhist Leisure, 55.
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particular rhetoric on ethnic heritage through experiential means such as embodiment and
corporeality. I thus conceive of beauty and ornament as 'technologies' in this acknowledgment of
their agency as actual objects that can shape human experience and in their susceptibility to be
consciously manipulated and used. And, as Daniel Miller acknowledges, these technologies can
be particularly powerful because we tend to ignore them, thereby permitting them to subtly
frame our comportment and identity.22
Technologies of Authenticity
In Eastern Sri Lanka, it becomes clear that beauty and ornamentation compose an
increasingly salient rhetoric to continue century-old debates over ethnic heritage and cultural and
religious "authenticity." This is significant in light of the fact that most scholars acknowledging
the Muslim public beautification of this area see it as evidence of 'Arabization, Wahhabism, or-more commonly and problematically--'Islamization.23' However, a close study of ornament
situates these and other local customs and ways of performing Muslimness within wider idioms
to defy normative uses of such terms like "Islamization" and "Arabization." When scholars
claim that these are merely "Islamic" ways of culture, in addition to making judgments as to what
constitutes normative culture based on a particularly configured imaginary, they are missing the
fact that they are negotiated against a Tamil/Hindu other and are thus highly specific and local.
This presentation of local identity through translocal means becomes much more significant
when seen in an ethnically and religiously divided place like Sri Lanka. "Appropriation" here is
a meaningless term that plays into notions of whole cultural imaginaries and privileges stasis as
normative. Insinuations of top-down transnational "influences" often invisiblize not only actor
agency but also the distinct local idioms in which such "influences" must be negotiated. Instead,
22
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I find that people often strategically employ the agency of transnationalisms to negotiate
everyday life, and they must negotiate it local idioms. With this understanding, ornamentation
becomes an interesting way to explore the complex question of what "ethnicity" means in this
context in Sri Lanka.
I argue beautification and ornamentation often appeal to foreign agency for power and
legitimacy while also simultaneously defending a distinct pride in and claim to the local. These
technologies are often used as groups and individuals seek to reposition their heritage both
spatially and temporally with particular power if foreignness—often rumored and/or enhanced
through rumor—is used to support the localized notions of authenticity. Ultimately I argue that
people use ornament, and particularly transnationalized ornaments, as technologies of
authenticity to claim power in ways that they cannot achieve from the State. This is both real
(NGOs, international political support, doctrinal unity) and imagined (cultural homogeneity,
ancestral/ethnic/biological purity). With a religious, political and ethnic view, these technologies
of authenticity seek to deconstruct spatial and perhaps biological realities (especially on the part
of Muslims, who claim Arab descent) and create new ones using what is perceived to be a
foreign aesthetic. However, they are negotiating this transnationality in local idioms with many
important local functions, which merits an understanding of the context.
A Brief Overview of Sri Lanka
I am now compelled to provide a brief and selective general history: Sri Lanka is an
extremely diverse island nation entangled in Indian Ocean trade routes both historically and
presently.24
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However, most scholars attribute heightened ethnic awareness--and to some extent even
the current ethnic categories themselves--as predominantly catalyzed by the British colonial
regime (1796-1948), though the Portuguese and Dutch had colonized the island in 1505-1658
and 1658-1796, respectively. During the medieval and renaissance periods, Thiranagama writes
that Sri Lanka was "highly socially and religiously heterogeneous" and "ethnic/racial categories
were not the basis of inclusion or exclusion." Rather, "A wide variety of social groups were
asymmetrically clustered around monarchies in dissimilar ways.”25 When the British defeated
the Kandyan kingdom in 1815 and united the island under a single administration for the first
time, "racial" groups began to receive distinct entitlements.
Some scholars have called the British's strategy, both in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, "divide
and rule." However, this perhaps more aptly describes the functions/consequences rather than the
intentions of the British administration. In institutionalizing "racial" categories, colonial powers
did not invent ethnic identities, but they supplied new and powerful channels for them to
flourish.26 Nissan and Stirrat write that the British colonial state had "misguided 'liberal'
sentiments which sought to protect the different customs of different 'races.'"27 There was still
considerable cultural/ethnic diversity within these groups when the British came, but today, the
nation is divided generally into three ethnic groups:28 the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority (74.5%),
the Tamil-Hindus (11.9%), and the Muslims (8.3%).29 For example, although as late at the 19th
century distinctions were still made between the 'native born' 'Ceylonese Moors" and "Indian
Spencer (New York: Routledge, 1990); Sujit Sivasundaram, Islanded: Britain, Sri Lanka, and the Bounds of an
Indian Ocean Colony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Sharika Thiranagama, In My Mother’s House:
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25
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26
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Coast Moors,”30 today Muslims of the Eastern Province tend to shed these cultural signifiers and
go by simply 'Muslim.’31
There is an important spatialization of ethnic groups. The majority of Tamils are
geographically concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country, Sinhalese dominate
the southern and central provinces, and Muslims live scattered throughout. These regional
distributions have a profound impact on politics of the area, with the southern and west-central
areas being at present the most powerful. The Tamil-dominated areas of the North and East saw
the vast majority of the conflict during the war, and politicians from these areas have sought (so
far unsuccessfully) more self-determination through devolution of power to these provinces.
There are significant populations of Muslims distributed throughout the island with diverse
heritage, political, ethnic, and religious affiliations. Though Muslim political power pre- and
post-independence was concentrated in south/western parts of the island, today, Muslim political
power is increasingly concentrated in the Eastern and Southeastern regions.32
In the 1970s, a number of militarized Tamil secessionist groups emerged out of complex
political, ethnic, religious, and linguistic tensions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil
minority in Sri Lanka.33 Violence intensified after riots broke out against Tamils across the
island in 1983 in what became known as Black Friday. In the succeeding years, the LTTE fought
for hegemony over all other groups while fighting viciously for an independent Tamil homeland
in the north and east provinces (the 'Tamil Eelam,' the imagined historic homeland and proposed
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independent state) as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).34 Civil war ensued until the
Sri Lankan forces handily defeated the LTTE in 2009 with a widely criticized final drive in
which tens of thousands of civilians were murdered. On top of this, there has also been an
alarming and fairly unchecked development of Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism in the tense postwar climate. Radical groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) have been
harassing and looting homes and shops of Christians and Muslims.35 Given these events, many
minorities feel unrepresented by the Sinhala-Buddhist state and powerless to do much about it.
With the recent election of President Maithripala Sirisena, many have hope that this chauvinism
has come to an end. It remains to be seen whether Maithripala Sirisena (often referred to simply
as "My3") will keep these hopes alive and make real reforms. My fieldwork was conducted
entirely during regime of the previous president, Mahinda Rajapakse (p.2005-2015).
Ramanathan-Azeez Debates: Muslimness as ‘Not Tamil’
We now return to Mr. Ajmal, whose opening comment speaks most directly to a political
exchange between Tamil politician Ponnambalam Ramanathan and Muslim politician I.L.M.
Abdul Azeez in the late 19th century. The two centralized councils instituted in the 1833
Colebrook-Cambridge reforms played an important role in soldifying Muslim identity in
particular: the Executive Council, which did most of the work, and the Legislative Council,
which consisted of unofficial members and was intended to be more of a ceremonial gesture.
Nonetheless, members saw it as a type of 'local Parliament.'36 The governor nominated unofficial
members from among the 'locals' to represent the different 'races.'37 Indeed, most scholars trace
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the crystallization of Muslim identity as a unified and distinct ethnic identity from that of Tamils
to this exchange.38
Ponnambalam Ramanathan was elected to the Legislative Council in 1883 as the Tamil
and de facto Muslim representative because there was no separate representative for the Muslim
communities at the time. He heard rumors that there would be a Muslim (and also a Kandyan
Sinhalese) member added to the Legislative Council and saw this as a threat to Tamil political
hegemony over other minorities. Ramanathan gave a famous and incendiary speech to the
Council in 1885 saying that the "Moors" were not a separate race, but, in fact, were ethnically
Tamils who converted to Islam. He claimed that the distinction of "Moors" as a racial category
was a mistake made by the Portuguese, who "applied this term to this community, not because
that was the name it went by in its own circle or among its neighbors, but because, like the
Moors of North Africa, its religion was Muhammedan."39 His thesis had four main points: "(1)
the language they speak at home in connection with, (2) their history, (3) their customs and (4)
physical features, the proof cumulatively leads to no other conclusion than that the Moors of
Ceylon are ethnologically Tamils."40 He published the speech in 1888 as "The Ethnology of the
Moors of Ceylon" in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Nuhman translates part of the
following statement by Siddi Lebbe, a prominent Muslim leader based in Kandy, in the Muslim
Nesan on May 7th, 1888 that illuminates some Muslim-elite reactions:
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The Muslims throughout the country are very angry and talk day and night about Mr.
Ramanathan's speech at the Asiatic Society that the Sri Lankan Muslims are Tamil
converts. I have received letters from various parts of the country, abusing Mr.
Ramanathan and degrading the Tamils.41
The most famous Muslim response was in 1907 by Siddi Lebbe's disciple I.L.M. Abdul
Azeez titled "A Criticism of Mr. Ramanathan's Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon." Azeez
pointed to the political motivations behind Ramanathan's argument to discredit it. He asserted
that Muslims, are, in fact, a distinct race from Tamils because they are not from South India;
rather, they descended from male Hashemite traders from Arabia who settled and married Tamil
women.42 Nonetheless, while Azeez asserted the importance and predominance of Arab ancestry,
he could not and did not deny their interconnectedness with Tamils. He writes:
"...of the Arab settlers some had their Arabian wives with them and others converted and
married Tamil women as it was with the Tamils, who were then called Malabars, that the
Arabs in contact. The entire cessation of intercourse with their own country, made the
Arabs to adapt themselves to their surroundings, and they gradually adopted the
language, customs, habits and manners of the people (Tamil) amongst whom they had
settled...."43
"...It is true that the Ceylon Moors have the customs of Stridhanam, alati, the tying of the
tali etc, and my explanation is that these have been borrowed by them from the Tamils; to
whose race their mothers, in most cases belonged, and among whom their fathers settled.
Does the fact that these customs have been borrowed by the Moors from the Tamils
prove in any degree that they are Tamils in descent and nationality?"44
Thus in these accounts, Azeez explicitly acknowledges a significant degree of cultural
similarity between Tamils and Muslims while simultaneously defending the community as a
distinct "race" because he claims it is still Arab blood running through the veins of Muslims. The
desire to be represented in an administrative system straight-jacketed by racial jargon led Azeez
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and others to over-argue their 'Arabness.' Of immense importance for this thesis, in order to
secure racial representation, Muslim elites eventually had to downplay any cultural similarities
they shared with Tamils, including even their shared Tamil language. Ramanathan and other
Tamil nationalists, on the other hand, sought to use their linguistic and cultural similarities to
absorb Muslims into their vote bank and maintain hegemony. Nuhman notes that "Ramanathan
gives [more] importance to matrilineal decent while Azeez totally neglects the matrilineal
descent and gives [more] importance to patrilineal descent since patriarchy was prevalent among
the Arabs and the Muslims."45
Race and Place
Sharika Thiranagama makes an important point when she observes that Azeez, though
seeking to claim Arab ancestry, "found himself trying not to emphasize the 'foreignness' of
Muslims against a Sinhala nationalist movement that had denounced Muslims and particularly
Indian Muslim migrants, as outsiders and foreigners."46 Indeed, certain Buddhist groups had
been targeting Christians and Muslims and "reclaiming" lands and processional spaces, with the
riots of 1915 pitting Buddhist groups against Muslims.47 Thiranagama explains that even though
the British ended up recognizing Muslims as a 'race,' "they had no specific place, thus were
absent in the second mythical story, in which certain kinds of people are considered to emanate
organically from certain kinds of places, and to have a legitimate 'voice' is to have 'a place of
your own.'"48 Because of this, Muslim elites like Azeez had to toe a fine line: they argued that
they were a distinct Arab race, but they had to maintain legitimate claims to living in the homes
they were born in.
45
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It is also important to keep in mind the diameter of circles in which these debates took
place. These were elite groups predominantly located in the politically powerful hubs in
Colombo and the Southern Province. Thiranagama writes that "southern Muslim urban elite
[attempted] to transform themselves from a regional elite to a national elite, speaking on behalf
of all Muslims"49 much like the Tamil and Sinhala nationalists had been doing. She points out
significant regional differences in politics, especially in the East, addressed in Chapter One.
Nonetheless, this blanketed "Arabicized" heritage has had a profound impact on Muslim
and Tamil political and cultural developments in the 20th century.50 The impact can be
summarized as twofold: (1) simplifying the complex and diverse heritage of Muslims across the
island, and (2) minimizing the significance of on-the-ground village-level commonalities
between Muslims and Tamils outside of these elite circles.51 Both of these effects, as I hope you
will see, are significant for understanding my field site. Indeed, still today people rearticulate and
extend these debates, which brings us back to the opening conversation with Mr. Ajmal. In the
interview excerpt below, he essentially refutes Ramanathan's claims point-by-point:
Ajmal: [Tamils say] Muslim people speak full Tamil. Muslims people do not speak full
Tamil. Tamil people's Tamil and Muslim people's Tamil are different. Now if I want to
say the time, they will use the Arabic [terms]. Like that...other things they say...We will
say "poddi" [for box]. They will say "peddi." We will say "poddi." Totally different.
Me: Yes, there are many differences.
Ajmal: Yes, totally different. Our Tamil and their Tamil are very different. Our Tamil is
like Telugu--have you seen?--it is like Tamil, but not Tamil. Written is Tamil.
Shibly: Malayalam...
Ajmal: Malayalam is there. It is its own language, but it is Tamil that they will write.
Like that if you say that in Sri Lanka Muslims speak Tamil...it is no special thing.
They speak 100% Tamil.... They will say "pinneram." Here [in Kattankudy] we will say
"isha." We will say "isha" for that time of the day. In the morning, they will say "kailai,"
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we say "suba". Like that, everything...We do not speak full Tamil. We speak about 40%
Tamil. But they say, "No, you speak Tamil!"52
Me: They also say that all religions are one, no?
Shibly: They told you? (repeats in Tamil) They told her that our religion and their
religion are the same. [to me in English] It is different.
Ajmal: Just that. There are differences. They are totally Hindus--South Asian. South
Asian at the start. Our origins are Arabic. The language, that is not a big deal. Also, the
appearance [facial features] is totally different. We are very different from them. Also
their clothes and our clothes are very different. But they say "no, no, no." So, [there is] a
problem (piraccanai). They say Tamils and Muslims are the same. At the beginning they
said [we were] "Islamiyya Tamilarkal" (Muslim Tamils). Like a small division (pirivu)
within the Tamil group. They said we were Muslims Tamils. After, they changed [it] a
little and said 'Tamil-speaking Muslims.' But that is also not correct. We are not speaking
Tamil. 50-50 of Tamil is there [in our speech]. So, we are not Tamil-speaking Muslims. I
am just 'Muslim'.53
Mr. Ajmal refers to some former categories for Sri Lankan Muslims and rejects them all,
concluding that he is only "Muslim"--religiously, ethnically, physically, and even linguistically.
Sri Lankan Muslims reject the category of Islaamiyat Tamilarkal (Muslim Tamils) although
this name has been generally accepted by Muslims in Tamil Nadu.54 It was primarily Tamil
nationalists like Ramanathan and later LTTE recruiters who attempted to include Muslims as
"Tamils" for particular political ends. Mr. Ajmal then goes on to reject the term "Tamil-speaking
people" (Thamil Peesum Makkal), which was previously seen as more inclusive. Nuhman writes
that from the 1950s to 1970s this term was used as linguistic rather than ethnic appeal, and he
notes that North-East Muslims in particular were willing to accept this label in politics.55 Now,
Mr. Ajmal discounts it on the grounds that he is not only "just Muslim" but also that he does
speak full Tamil. Given this history of ethnic identity, I argue that ornamentation—
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concomitantly with the gradual ‘elimination’ of other ‘Hindu’ practices—is significant as both an
indication of ethnic identity and this identity’s authentic construction.
Religious Revival
Moreover, with transnational religious revival movements, technological advances, and
increasingly mobile capital and labor flows Sri Lankan Muslims have many technologies at their
disposal to articulate and perform this racial claim. When Azeez published his response to
Ramanathan, he maintained that these 'borrowed' customs did not negate Muslim identity or
Arab decent. Even this has become unacceptable to many at my field site. M.A. Nuhman writes,
"Most of the traditional and folk cultural practices have been gradually eliminated through this
process of cultural purification from the early post-independence period."56 From the eighteenth
and particularly the second half of the nineteenth century, there were waves of Islamic reform
movements sweeping throughout South and Southeast Asia such as the Ahl-e Sunnat wa Jama'at,
Deobandis,Tablighi Jama'at, and Jama'at-e Islami.57 It was particularly after Sri Lanka's
independence in 1948 that these movements came to Sri Lanka, and of these, Tablighi Jamaat
was most significant. In Kattankudy, the most prominent reform movement has been Tawhid
Jama'at, which came to the area in the 1980s.58 Actors from this movement have been accused of
committing acts of violence against Sufi groups in the area for 'Hindu' or 'folk' practices,
discussed briefly in Chapter One.
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"Traditional and folk cultural practices" is read as "Hindu/Tamil practices." Before the
war and before increased connection to the Middle East, Muslims in the east still took Tamil
names, covered their heads with sarees, performed in Hindu-esque dance-dramas,62 and even
participated in a number of rituals like the ones above mentioned by Azeez. While portraits of
blissful pre-war harmony are undoubtedly idealized, I would also suggest that the segregation of
spaces due to conflict has an important role in negotiates these given the previously
interconnected history of the East. McGilvray observes: "Until venturing outside of one's own
ethnic neighborhood became a dangerous undertaking as the Eelam "problems" progressively
worsened, some Moors would consult Tamil astrologers." 59 The war, though, coincides with
6

many other currents developing simultaneously. Thus, it is important to note that such
polarization is complicated by not only factors of spatial segregation and conflict, but also by
particular 'revivalist' sentiments that denounce such "non-Islamic" practices in the name of
"purification." This thesis in large part attempts to examine closely the customs of beautification
and ornament as technologies that can illuminate these processes of constructing authenticity in
light of these "purification" movements.
The Particularity of the East Coast
In the Eastern Province, there is a common pattern for towns to alternate Tamil-MuslimTamil-Muslim. Before the war, many towns in the East were organized under a unified village
council. After conflict escalated, the number of councils has doubled to accommodate both a
Tamil and Muslim one in light of ethnic tensions and pressures.60 Dennis McGilvray also finds
this at his site in Akkaraipattu, which formally divided into two separate municipal government
(one for Tamils, one for Muslims) after ethnic clashes in the 1980s. However, he comments that
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"Even before the outbreak of the Eelam Wars, the policy of the local government had been to
adjust the boundaries of the Tamil and Moorish divisions whenever necessary to maintain a strict
separation in local administration between Tamil and [Muslim] wards."61
Tamils and Muslims have shared a history that is distinct from communities in other parts
of the island. The demography is 42% Tamil, 32% Muslim (about a third of total Muslim
population), and 26% Sinhalese.62 In Batticaloa District where I conducted my fieldwork, a
preliminary report (2007) estimates a distribution of 74% Tamil, 25% Moor (Muslim), and 0.5%
Sinhalese.63 The ancestry of the Sri Lankan Muslims and Tamils of the eastern coast of Sri
Lanka is intimately connected with centuries of trade between South/east Asia and the Middle
East (since pre-Islamic times), and between India and Sri Lanka. Dennis McGilvray's meticulous
documentation of the kinship patterns of Tamils and Muslims in the Eastern province indicates
that both these communities share matrilineal kinship patterns. In this, Muslims in the east are
distinct from other Muslims on the island.64 In Crucible of Conflict, McGilvray builds on
decades of fieldwork to propose that cultural similarities between Mappilas of Kerala, the
Marakkayars of Tamil Nadu, and the Moors of Sri Lanka suggest common origins. These groups
themselves also have a history of intermarriage with Arab merchants.65 'Inter-marriage' and
Tamil conversion, while less common today, are likely to have occurred regularly in the past.
This, combined with the still-existing shared matrilineal clan system ("kudi"), similar kinship
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terms, land tenure, and mosque and temple trust structures all point to a more muddled
ancestry. 66
7

Politically, too, there has been significant ambiguity between Tamils and Muslims in the
east as compared to other regions. Thiranagama, for example, points out, "In discussions
surrounding the 1931 Donoughmore constitution instituting territorial representation, eastern
Muslims supported territorial rather than communal representation in an attempt to wrestle
control away from southern Muslim elites."67 Moreover, unlike in other parts of the country,
many Muslims in the Eastern Province had ambiguous political loyalties with the Tamil LTTE
and even supported them for some time after the outbreak of war in 1983. For the first years of
the war, Tamil nationalists sought to include Muslims within their fight for a homeland (though
ultimately not as equals), and there were reports of LTTE support among young Muslim boys, of
local Tamils being assisted by Muslims in 1985, and of Tamils seeking refuge in Muslim
towns. 68 I was also told at least four times throughout the course of my fieldwork of a famous
7

political declaration in 1976 by MHM Ashraff who said "If elder brother Amirthalingam [then
Tamil leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front coalition in Parliament] failed to get a Tamil
Eelam, the younger brother Ashraff will get it" (Ismail, Abdullah, and Fazil 2004b: 201). 69
7

Ashraff, however, then went on to establish the first Muslim political party (the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress or SLMC) in 1981.
A member of the Kattankudy Urban Council told me that many Muslims in the area had
supported the LTTE before 1990. He himself had supported them while he was working in
Qatar. He described Kattankudy after 1990 to me during those times as a "prison." No one could

66

McGilvray, Crucible of Conflict, 77; McGilvray, “A Matrilineal Sufi Shaikh,” 247.
Thiranagama, In My Mother’s House, 119.
68
McGilvray and Raheem, “Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict.”
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Thiranagama, In My Mother’s house, 118.
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come in or out. We were sitting in is his large house near the beach in New Kattankudy at the
time, and a servant came up to him, asked a quick question, and left. After he had gone, Uncle
told me that that man was Tamil, and he had worked for him for over 10 years. He said that the
man was like part of the family to him. The man lived across the lagoon in LTTE territory and
continued to come to his house despite LTTE orders forbidding people to move between
territories. While talking with a few other politically active people in Kattankudy, they also made
it a point to tell me that the Kattankudy Federation of Mosques, a powerful local NGO and
community-organizing group, had also gathered relief items and prepared food for the people in
Araiyampathy. From the stories I have heard, both towns were technically "cleared" areas--areas
secured by the army--and the area across the lagoon was "uncleared"--LTTE territory.
Nonetheless, this story paints a more murky picture.
In 1990 this relatively ambiguous climate became more divided when LTTE suddenly
forced approximately 90,000 Muslims70 to abandon their homes in the Northern Province in an
act of ethnic cleansing. That same year, the LTTE massacred Muslims in the east in mosques
during Jumma prayers, including a mosque in Kattankudy, the town I lived in. This violence and
fear fostered the imperative for Tamils and Muslims to flee into spatially segregated
communities, and this segregation remains today throughout much of the East. Moreover, the
government sought to exploit the cracks between the Muslim and Tamil communities through
such tactics as disseminating leaflets and organizing Muslim Home Guard forces.71 The idea
that the government is intentionally trying to divide these communities persists today (discussed
below in Chapter 3).

70
71

Farah Mihlar. “The State of Sri Lanka’s Muslims.” Economic & Political Weekly XLIV, no 38 (2009): 24.
McGilvray and Raheem, “Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict,” 21.
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In the East, 2004 was another key year. Violence lessened after the tsunami, which itself
devastated the East coast.72 Violence escalated again in 2005 in violation of a Ceasefire
Agreement. In March 2004, an armed LTTE mutiny took place in the East, when former LTTE
Colonel Karuna defected. The LTTE lost control of many of the areas it had occupied in the east,
but people continued to be threatened now from three sides: the GoSL army, the LTTE, and the
Karuna faction (TMVP). Dennis McGilvray and Mirak Raheem note that Muslims were
particularly vulnerable, especially at the hands of Karuna's TMVP faction. They write that
Muslims in Kattankudy were accusing the Karuna of harassment as late as January 2007,73
International Crisis Group reports ongoing violence in 2008,74 and it is likely to have continued
after this date. The political wing of this faction--the TMVP--is the current ruling party of
Araiyampathy, Kattankudy's southern neighbor and the other place I lived.
Additionally, memories of violence live on in the decrepit buildings that remain
untouched and in ruins that have intentionally been preserved. Of the latter, Meera Jumma
Pallivassal was by far the most significant of my field site. It was the site of the infamous and
tragic August1990 'Kattankudy Mosque Massacre.' The LTTE open fired in the mosque during
Friday Jumma prayers and murdered over 100 people. Most people believe it was the faction that
is now known as TMVP, the current Tamil political party in power. It was this event in particular
that seems to mark the start of the "problem times" in this area, and it was one of the first places
that I was shown when I arrived. When some distant relatives of my Aunty who had fled to
Switzerland returned to Kattankudy for the first time in five years, it was one of the things that

72

See Tsunami Recovery in Sri Lanka: Ethnic and Regional Dimensions, ed. Dennis B. McGilvray and Michelle R.
Gamburd, (London: Routledge. 2010).
73
McGilvray and Raheem, “Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict,” 45-48.
74
“Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province: Land, Development, Conflict,” International Crisis Group Asia Report 159,
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they wanted to see. The bullet holes have been left as an eerie and poignant reminder of this
tragedy, and people recreate and grieve this tragedy even today (see Figure 1).75

Figure 1, Source: author.

Organization
The first chapter lays out the specific context of the two towns concerned in this thesis:
Kattankudy, a Muslim town, and Araiyampathy, a predominantly Tamil town. I focus on rumors,
origin stories, territory and land disputes, and relative political and economic power with
emphasis on real and rumored transnational networks. I argue that, while memories of violence
from the war times undoubtedly shape communities in ways I can never fathom, the primary
source of dispute between Muslims and Tamils as such is land. I also discuss how the greatest
concern within Kattankudy is directed "inward" between different sects of Islam. Rejecting the
75

My Facebook friends still post about it and people are making and circulating documentaries. See Solvathellam
Unmai, “LTTE Attacked mosque in Kattankudy, Batticaloa,” YouTube video, 5:16 minutes, Aug 12, 2014.
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theories of violence in scholarship on this region as 'normal politics,' I use Laura Ring's
conception of peace as a sustained in tensions of exchanges, and posit (though I do not assert)
that material exchanges when conceived in broad dialectical idioms may facilitate cultural
exchanges at varying levels.
The second chapter takes seriously everyday bodily ornaments--those 'mere' decorative
pieces--as constructors of public and as technologies accessible for women to embody and
engage with polemics surrounding cultural authenticity, community, and personal piety. I look at
beauty as a normative and axiomatic concept that negotiates community imaginaries and at
ornaments as the technologies for these imaginaries to be embodied. I show how these material
technologies are intertwined with rumors yet achieve such salience as embodiments of
community, culture, and religion as to render a term like 'vernacular' useless. With a close
analysis of tiny examples such as nose rings and nail polish, I illuminate how beauty and
ornament embody processes of oppositional, dialectic and triangulated cultural construction
rather than simplistic top-down or bottom-up conceptions of "authenticity."
The third chapter looks at public beautification as ornaments of landed "bodies" of
community imaginaries. I illuminate the salience of this idiom while also linking it to other
related landed idioms such as the construction of temples and mosques. I show how they are
constructed by political elites for political reasons, including to appeal to and cohere their 'vote
banks.' However, I also show that despite very specific intentions these works have multiple
functions and operate polysemically at different levels. I also demonstrate how these works
participate tangibly in land contestation and in appeals to globalizing markets. I extend the
processes established in Chapter Two to illuminate how these beautification projects embody
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dialectical and triangulated processes based on living imaginaries that negotiate communities and
what they consider to be authentic.
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Chapter One: Selected Context: Land, Politics, and Rumors
"One commonplace saying compares Tamil-Muslim relations to "puttu," a staple favored
by both Tamils and Muslims, long steamed rolls of rice flour cakes glued together with
alternating stripes of coconut. Tamils and Muslims are said to live together like rice and coconut,
integral but separate." 76
"Even if some...content themselves with [the saying] 'Like puttu and coconut batter' as
tasty imagery representing the Tamil-Muslim relationship, the truth based on these two
ethnicities/races' relationship for some issues is that of 'water with oil.' Just like that [the] two
will not join as one. This is situation that has come to be made reality. 77
8

8

Basic Demographics
In the "puttu and coconut" pattern, Kattankudy was made to be a separate administrative
entity about twenty years ago and has an essentially 100% ethnically Muslim population.78
Reflective of the attempt to create an ethnically homogeneous division, Kattankudy faces
extreme population pressures with box-like area of only 2.56 square kilometers and the highest
population density in Sri Lanka. 79 The cramped living spaces resulted in the pollution of private
8

wells by sewage, which has forced the division secretariat to pipe in water.80 In addition to high
birth rates, displacement due to conflict contributes to this population pressure. Residents of
smaller Muslim villages in the surrounding area fled to Kattankudy during the escalation of

76
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Thiranagama, In My Mother’s House, 122.
K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampathy, 31. Original Tamil: “சிலர் இலக்கிய நயத்துடன் "ஈரினமும்,

ஓருயிர் ப ோல் வோழும் பூமி' என்றும் ' ிட்டும் பேங்கோய்ப் பூவும் ப ோல்' என்றும் சுவவ ட
உவமோனங்கள் கூறி ேமிழ், முஸ்லீம் உறவிவன ேிருப்ேிப் ட்டுக் ககோண்டோலும்
உண்வமயிபலபய இந்ே இரு இனங்களின் உறவினடிப் வடயில் அவமந்ேேோன சில
விடயங்கள் 'எண்கெய்யுடன் ேண்ெவை
ீ
எப் டித்ேோன் கலந்ேோலும் இைண்டும் ஒன்று
பசைோது என்ற நிவலவயபய யேோர்த்ேமோக கசயல் டுத்ேி வருகிறது.”
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Hasbullah and Korf, “Muslim geographies,” 35.
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Hasbullah and Korf note that this seems to be a general trend among Muslims living throughout the Batticaloa
District, where they live in 2% of the district’s territory despite being 25% of the overall population, Shahul
Hasbullah and Benedikt Korf, “Muslim geographies, violence and the antimonies of community in eastern Sri
Lanka,” The Geographical Journal 179, no.1 (2012): 34-5.
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violent conflict in the 80s and 90s.81 Migrants settled into frontier spaces and boundary areas
between Tamils and Muslims (places that local Kattankudy residents did not want). Kattankudy
now divides itself into 'Old Kattankudy' (lagoon side, west of the main road) and 'New
Kattankudy' (beach side, east of the main road). In spite of considerable displacement and
movement of peoples in the area--officially, at least--the territorial boundaries of Kattankudy
have not changed.82 Like this, conflict has disturbed and redistributed populations while
crystalizing political boundaries of territory on an increasingly ethnic basis. The migrants have
also replaced some of the cheap wage labor from Tamils in neighboring settlements, which
further restructures work relations.83
The other place this thesis concerns is Araiyampathy, which is actually—unlike
Kattankudy—the largest village within the larger Manmunai Pattu Division. Araiyampathy has a
population of roughly 7,000-12,000 people who are predominantly Tamil.84 Most people I have
spoken with—and even official documents and website—conflate and use interchangeably
'Araiyampathy' (village) for 'Manmunai Pattu' (division). I argue that this is more than mere
semantics and, in fact, has a significant impact on local politics and community imaginaries. This
is because the vast majority of people in Araiyampathy are ethnic Tamils (including both Saivite
Hindus and Christians) while the Manmunai Pattu Division, which is about one third Muslim, on
81

For example, I often visited a particular dargah (Sufi Muslim saint tomb-shrine, also ziaram) in Puunochchimunai
(a town north of Kattankudy) and spoke on several occasions with a man who cares for the shrine. He told me that,
while the land of the dargah itself was given by Tamils, there used to be about 40 or so Muslim families living in
Poonochchimunai who are now living Nochchimunai. In those days there used to be a Jumma mosque, a burial
ground, and a Muslim school, which has since become a school for handicapped children. Muslims still travel to this
dargah—particularly for auspicious occasions—but Puunochchimunai has become a virtually 100% Tamil
settlement. The government had promised to resettle the Muslim people. Shrine caretaker, recorded interview with
author, April 30th, 2014.
82
Hasbullah and Korf, “Muslim geographies,” 35.
83
Ibid., 35.
84
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the whole has been home to both Tamils and Muslims long before the war. The conflation of
Tamil village with a diverse division, if relatively subconscious, has significant functions. It
gives an empty legitimacy to arguments that Muslims have encroached on what is 'rightfully'
Tamil lands, which is what any land in the division--particularly government land--seems to have
become. It also plays against Kattankudy as a 100% Muslim Division. When describing to me
the towns or explaining something about culture, many people would say, "Kattankudy is
Muslim village, and Araiyampathy (more generally meaning Manmunai Pattu) is Tamil village."
Araiyampathy is mostly Tamil, but the Division on the whole is diverse and has been for
generations.
Basic Demography

Kattankudy Division

Manmunai Pattu (Araipattai)
Division

Area (km2)

2.56

21.5

Total Population

47, 603

31,984

Sector

Urban

Rural

Occupation

Business

Labor (2354 families)

(from most to least
prominent)

“Industry”

Government (1462 families)

Fishing

Fishing (1015 families)

Figure 2: Source(s): Manmunai Pattu and Kattankudy Divisional Secretariat Websites

Population
byReligion

Kattankudy Division

Manmunai Pattu (Araipattai)
Division

Buddhist

38

63

Hindu

50

21,350

Muslim

40,254

7,565

Roman Catholic

13

1,075

May 2015 Final Paper, 2014-2015 Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Fellowship, Penn Humanities Forum
Kimberly Kolor, SAS 2015, University of Pennsylvania

Page 36

Other Christian

0

640

Figure 3: Source(s): 2012 Population and Housing Census, with different (likely low) numbers for
total population (Kattankudy: 40,356; Manmunai Pattu: 30,694)

Political and Economic Disparities
As many people pointed out to me, Kattankudy, in contrast to Araiyampathy, is more
aptly called a 'town' (in English) rather than a 'village' (kirāmam). Hasbullah and Korf write,
"Besides being a religious powerhouse, Kattankudy is also an economically thriving trading hub
in the east, with busy local markets and multiple networks to the national and international
markets."85 One Tamil man, Mr. Paamannan, put it this way:
If you take Kattankudy that is a big village there we go every day that is a small town if I
want to buy textiles, I'll go to Kattankudy, if I want to buy medicine, I'll go to Kattankudy
if I want to do building materials, I'll go to Kattankudy because we don't have those
facilities in Araiyampathy. 86
9

The overall effect is very ostentatious, and Kattankudy's visible economic prosperity
(considering its having a large number of businessmen) looms ever larger when contrasted with
Araiyampathy (which has a large number of laborers). The main road in Kattankudy is
completely filled with hundreds of fashionable and freshly-painted two-story shops while in
Araiyampathy there are a few scattered and overwhelmingly run-down one-story shops. These
may seem like superficial points, but they function as persistent visual reminders of a stark
economic disparity.
Economic power here is, of course, intimately linked with political; in this, also,
Kattankudy dominates. Kattankudy has a very prominent politician and political advocate in

85
86

Hasbullah and Korf, “Muslim geographies,” 34.
Mr. Paamanan (microfinance NGO worker), recorded interview with author, April 21, 2014.
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Hizbullah, Deputy Minister of Economic Development. 87 Hizbullah has close connections to the
9

then President Mahinda Rajapakse, and he plastered large posters of his face and of the two of
them together so that everyone would know this.
These factors are again more dramatic considering the general loss of political agency
that Tamils in the north and east face post-war. McGilvray notes that such disparity is common
throughout the Eastern province. He observes that, "Today, in the wake of the 2009 defeat of the
LTTE – and despite the disproportionately devastating impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami of
2004 upon the Muslim community– the Muslims today are visibly the most prosperous
community on the east coast, and their educational achievements have caught up to those of the
Tamils, who initially benefited from nineteenth-century Christian missionary schooling." 88 As
9

noted in the introduction, there are also extensive beautification projects that contribute to a
display of bustle, wealth, and development (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). I found that Tamils
and Muslims often felt and acknowledged these disparities. During an interview with Mr. Ajmal,
a school teacher and former campaign manager for Hizbullah, he said that Tamil people were
"jealous" (poṟāmai) or "scared" (payam) of Muslims. He and Shibly Sir, my research associate
who was present at the time, had a good laugh after that.
Mr. K. Sabaratnam explained to me his frustration with the relative "laziness" and lack of
unity amongst Araiyampathy people.89 In The Soil of Araiyampathy, he commends Kattankudy
people's efforts writing, "Because of the people's hard work, motivation, perseverance, birth
rates, and political factors, today [Kattankudy] has grown in astonishing beauty within a short

87

With the recent regime in the election of President Maitripala Sirisena, the political status of the allies of the
former president Mahinda Rajapakse is uncertain.
88
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period of time. One cannot help but appreciate their driven efforts."90 I also heard much less
generous (Tamil) explanations of Kattankudy's success. A wealthy Tamil businessman, Mr.
Aadhesh, explained in detail how Muslim businesses smuggle foreign goods from the Middle
East, becoming visibly agitated as he explained this to me. Mr. Aadhesh lamented that "In all
present situations, they are the leaders. Muslims are the leaders. They have, this is the thing, they
have the money in a crooked way. I am telling frankly."91
In Araiyampathy, the leading politician is Poopalapillai Prasanthan. He is the local leader
of the TMVP party, which had local power as an ally of the Rajapakse regime. However, there is
also a strong TNA presence and support amongst Araiyampathy people. Prasanthan is widely
acknowledged as the most significant politician in Araiyampathy, but he is also feared and
disliked by many. My (Muslim) research associate and his friend urged me to speak with him so
I could hear his "racist" opinions. My Tamil teacher warned me multiple times to stay away from
him--"he is a dangerous fellow!" So, I asked a close contact arrange an interview with him. He,
to my great dismay, failed to show up and ignored my subsequent calls and texts. (Hint
eventually taken.) He is the man behind Araiyampathy's public beautification projects
mentioned briefly above and discussed at length in Chapter Three, but his power, wealth, and
influence are relatively limited when compared to that of Minister Hizbullah.
Transnational Aid
In this brief overview of local politicial economies, it is imperative to highlight the role of
transnational aid. Given this particular region's history as both a war-torn and tsunami-affected
90

K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampathy, 28. Original Tamil: மக்களின் உவைப்பு, ஊக்கம்,
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area, together with Sri Lanka's 'developing nation' status more generally, it hardly needs to be
stated that foreign aid and NGOs have become in some ways normalized as a part of everyday
life. I saw UNHCR tarps repurposed for funerals and often heard directions like "just past
Oxfam." In this way, transnational connections are often tangible. Sometimes it was hard to
distinguish if the foreign connections were real or imagined, but I maintain that even as rumor
these connections are important. A detailed analysis of the foreign politics and positions of
people in these towns is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to recognize
that different groups not only make claims to different degrees of "pure" foreign origins (i.e.
Indian or Arabian), they also have increasingly real connections in globalizing capitalist markets.
These may seem like self-evident and ordinary commentaries on political events, but I
found it striking during my fieldwork how often people would refer to and appeal to foreign aid,
foreign NGOs, and foreign political power. Remittances also play an extremely important role in
the Sri Lankan economy and in discourse surrounding transnational connections and power. In
2012, Sri Lankans living abroad sent about $6.1 billion dollars, which was about 8% of the total
GDP.93 In 2013, remittances grew by 13% at $6.8 billion dollars. Remittance data is typically
very rough, but it still serves to show the significant role that foreign and transnational
connections--even amongst family members--play in sustaining the Sri Lankan economy.
Additionally, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake calls for scholars to pay more attention to the
transnational aid networks in Sri Lanka and other conflict-affected nations. Though her larger
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argument is outside the scope of this thesis, she points out that transnational aid has been
intimately linked to peace-processes and targeted certain communities at the expense of others.94
I argue that it is significant for daily life that people are consistently turning to foreign aid
and agency. I would suggest that this is especially salient because these two communities are
nationally minorities in a state that seems perfectly content to keep them on the margins. With
the government refusing to devolve any real power to the provinces, most people seemed to
agree that Tamil and Muslim people didn't have much representation in the State. I noticed many
Tamil people were grateful to the U.S. for calling for a UN investigation of GoSL war crimes, a
couple people commenting on how India has abandoned the Tamil people, and many people
mentioning how the Muslims were always getting help from Arabian countries. Many people at
my site (except for a Sinhala police and a small group of government-supporting Tamils) felt the
state was oppressing them. Though in this area Muslims were in general viewed as better
connected to government resources, for Muslims, there was a threat--especially at the time of my
fieldwork--from Buddhist extremists that were persecuting Muslims with rumored support from
the (Sinhalese-Buddhist) State.95 For Tamils it was continued oppression as losers of the
secessionist conflict coupled with a sense of betrayal in light of Indian silence. A key Tamil
informant told me,
"So our people are very helpless, are very helpless....The other thing is Indian
government cannot also take any small step because the government is so friendly with
China. To pursue their own interest India is keeping silent. India is keeping silent."96
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Much like certain stereotypes come to be particularly salient, so, too, were these
conceptions of who had foreign connections and who did not. It was also more than idle gossip-people feel real connections and cultivate their own. And these connections are frequently
communally based. For example, after Eid prayers, a group of Muslims burned Israeli and
American flags. On one occasion, a Tamil man complained to me that Muslims would have
hartal (a sort of strike from all business) for Muslim deaths in Gaza, but not if a Tamil man next
door died. The Muslim politician mentioned above, Mr. Ajmal, seemed to agree that Tamil
Hindus didn't get a lot of help from international communities. Instead, according to him, Tamil
Hindus would forward their complaints to Tamil Christians, who receive more aid from Western
Christian organizations. He argued that Tamil Hindus have built 150 houses on Muslims lands in
Manmunai Pattu with the help of NGOs internationally. He says that the Hindus are supposed to
have converted to claim the lands, but he claims they do not. "They will keep a cross on the
house, but inside they are keeping a [god] with lamps.” 97
1

One prominent example of very tangible transnational connections and aid is the case of
the widely controversial Saddam Hussein Nagar, located near the town of Eravur about 20 km
north of the towns I lived in. 98 This town's construction was highly contested at the time of its
1

construction and it remained unoccupied for some time before residents were able to settle there.
A disputed area in Manmunai Pattu presents another local example that illustrates how these
foreign connections translate in very real ways to land disputes like the ones described above. A
tsunami resettlement program in Ollikulam has been the source of tension and Tamil worries.
97

Mr. Ajmal and and Shibly Sir, second recorded interview with author, June 29, 2014.
In 1978 floods in the area lead locals to approach the Iraqi embassy for assistance. Saddam Hussein responded by
organizing the funds to construct the neighborhood of around 100 houses, a school, and its central mosque, Medina
Mosque. People were reported to have kept his picture in their homes and named their children after him. After
2003, these picture apparently have been taken down, but people were reported in some media outlets as being
highly critical of the U.S.’s involvement in Saddam’s capture in 2003. “Gloom in Saddam’s Sri Lanka Village,”
BBC South Asia, Dec. 16, 2003. Accessed Jan. 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3323455.stm.
98
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According to my uncle in the Kattankudy Urban Council, Muslim British Aid helped build about
100 houses: 70 for Muslims (who were disproportionately affected by the tsunami) and 30 for
Tamils. A member of the Kattankudy Urban Council described this as a "peace community,"
though you may by now guess that it signifies quite the opposite at present. A key Tamil
informant, Mr. Aadhesh offered another explanation of Ollikulam village saying, "Muslim
governments Iran, Iraq, Saudi, Kuwait--they have given the money to the Muslim trustee. They
have purchased that land and built Muslim houses and Muslim mosques." 99
1

A large number of Tamil people I spoke with (especially those politically active), would
describe to me how Muslims are receiving tons of money and help from countries like Saudi
Arabia to help develop the Muslim community. A former Catholic bishop told me that a couple
of Muslim came to his doorstep asking to buy land. He said that they told him he could name any
price because people from Saudi Arabia had given them a huge amount to buy lands and spread
their religion. Again, the aim of this thesis is not to investigate the veracity of these claims, but
instead to recognize these sorts of rumors and living conceptions as important constructors—
modalities—of public space in the area. Transnational appeals fuel countless rumors and gossips.
Moreover, I hope to show in the succeeding two chapters, inspires conceptions of beauty and
choices of ornament.
Origin Stories: Araiyampathy Pride
The origin legends of the towns function to legitimate claims to territory in contemporary
land disputes and serve as source of cultural authenticity and pride, particularly on the part of
politically active Tamil people. Araiyampathy, I was often told, was a particularly special village

99

Aadhesh (Araiyampathy hotel owner), interview.
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because of its rich and ancient history.100 My literary Tamil teacher and research associate--who
was a former government servant and had worked in the Russian embassy--told me that his book
is the only attempt to record the village's history. He titled the book The Soil of Araiyampathy
(Āraiyampati maṇ) because he says the people revere the soil like a god. He writes that members
of this village descend from South Indian soldiers and navigators who had accompanied invading
groups from South India: After Vijayan's time, in the period intermittently between 200 B.C. to
1224 A.D., the Tamils of the Chera, Chola, and Pandya people and the Kalinga Dynasty invaded
the nation, ruled for some time, crowned some small kings, and then left and went back to South
India.101 The South Indian rulers that governed here thought it was possible that the Sinhala
people that they had fought and made disappear might again return with forces and carry out
attacks. Fearing this and taking precaution, they established soldiers to protect the shores near
the strip of land on both sides of the Batticaloa lagoon as permanent guards left to guard the river
"forever.”102
According to his account, these soldiers were river guards and landed on Araiyampathy's
western side traveling along the lagoon in gondolas and other boats.103 The first great ruler of
Araiyampathy was the Maha Rani (Great Queen) Ulaha Natchi (literally, "World Ruler") and she
reportedly ruled from what is now the Muslim town of Sikaram (Literally, "Peak"). There is a
statue of her on horseback wielding a sword along the median of the town's main road, discussed
in Chapter 13. Another town elder, Mr. Tambimuttu, says that Ulaha Natchi came from the
Kalinga [dynasty] in India. She brought with her a Siva lingam and built a temple with a huge
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‘Mr. Tambimuttu’ (former Araiyampathy government servant), recorded interview with author, April 13, 2014;
‘M.K Master’ (Araiyampathy village elder), recorded interview with author, July 28 th, 2014. ‘Aadesh’
(Araiyampathy hotel owner), recorded interview with author, April 13, 2014.
101
K. Sabaratna, personal note to author, April 17th, 2014.
102
K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampathy, 5.
103
Ibid., 27.
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gopuram (tower) in Koyilkullam that was later destroyed by the Portuguese. Mr Tambimuttu
says that they have found a ruined pillar from this temple and installed it with Araiyampathy's
Pillaiyar (Ganesha) temple.104
Origin Stories: Kattankudy
Kattankudy's history as told by my Tamil contacts is comparatively "recent" (beginning
in the 1500s) and of course less grand.105 Mr. Tambimuttu told the following story:
"The Muslims alone have come from Arabia. Having come from Arabia, in Kattankudy
from the place of Puunochchimunai, a man named Kaththan came. He was a Vedan
[hunter]. Kaththan came and was cooking for himself. He kept a stone and lit [the fire].
Then, the Arabians came [in ships] and saw this stone and light. Here there are people
[they said]. We want to speak with them. They came just like that. Muslims are the
people that have come from Arabia. The Arabians came and married Tamil women and
will be there. Muslim women did not come. The men came alone and for business."106
K. Sabaratna includes the following account in his book:
Then [in those times] Kattankudy and Araiyampathy had been the same unnamed
geographical area with a reduced population. Katthan's own five girls married Turk
Muslims in about the time of 1500 A.D. It is in that time that history tells [us] that
Muslims came to Sri Lanka for business reasons. Ulaka Natchi's time was fourth century
(312-331). Therefore, they both came at different times.107
The Kattankudy Divisional Secretariat official website has only the following blurb on
the history: "The History name of this Village is called as Kattankudy so that a Business man
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‘Mr. Tambimuttu’ (former Araiyampathy government servant), interview.
K. Sabaratna, personal note.
106
‘Mr. Tambimuttu’, interview.
107
K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampathy, 114. Original Tamil: அப்ப ோது இப் ிைபேசம் கோத்ேோன்குடி,
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ஆவையம் ேி என்று க யரிடப் டோது ஒபை நிலப் ைப் ோகவும் குடிசனச்கசறிவு
மிகக்குவறந்ே இடமோகவும் இருந்ேிருக்கின்றது. கோத்ேோன் ேனது க ண்கள் ஐவவையும்
துலுக்க முஸ்லீம்களுக்கு மனம் கசய்து ககோடுத்ே கோலம் கி. ி.1500ம் ஆண்டுகோலப்
குேியோக இருக்கலோம். அக்கோலப்

குத்யில்ேோன் முஸ்லீம்கள் வர்த்ேகபநோக்கில்

இலங்வகக்கு வந்ேோர்கள் என்று வைலோறு கூறுகிறது. உலகநோச்சியின் கோலம் கி. ி. 4ம் (312331) ஆகபவ, இருவைது கோலமும் பவறுபவறோனவவ.
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who named by "kaththan" from Arabia got married a woman and lived in this village."108 So, in
an interesting break from the previous account, the namesake of the town is here an Arabian man
and not a Vedan (although 'Kaththan' is then perhaps a peculiar "Arab" name). The subject of
Kattankudy's origins never came up in my discussions with Kattankudy people, and I hadn't
thought to ask at the time. I would argue, though, that this is significant in illuminating a
distinction in 'historical legitimacy' and pride in heritage. While Araiyampathy elders boast of
their ancient history and the great Ulaha Natchi as one of the foremost specialties of
Araiyampathy, Kattankudy people do not seem as zealous about the story of their ancestors. As
far as I could tell, the "historical fact" that was most important--and important it is--is that
Kattankudy people and Muslims more generally descended from Arab traders (who, of course,
married Tamil ladies).
I did find a history of another Muslim town, Eravur, about 20 kilometers north of
Kattankudy, which echoes Mr. Tambimuttu's story. They write that the first people were a native
fishing people, the "Timilars." He writes that Mukkuvars from Jaffna (who are also discussed in
The Soil of Araiyampathy) also came and were living in the area. He calls the Muslims that
came "Paddaaniyar,”109 and says that came by sea from either Afghanistan or North India, and
spoke Urdu. He also claims that India's border state of Afghanistan had people called "Paddani"
people.110 He writes that Paddani people came in a ship that wrecked near the shore of
108

“About Us: Overview,” Kattankudy Divisional Secretariat, website.
He writes that they engaged in selling dried peas or poṭṭaṇi. This seems perhaps an unlikely business to bring
regular trade from the Middle East. Dr. Renganathan suggests that this name could roughly mean “foreign people”
or “people from town.” Interestingly, in addition to peoples of there N/W region of the subcontinent, there is also a
Pattani region in Thailand with a Muslim community.
110
Eravur History. Eravur: Eravur Historical Research Centre, 2005, 2-4. Original Tamil: ஏகனனில் அவர்கள்
109

எனப் டுபவோர் இந்ேியோவில் உருதுகமோைி ப சுவர்களோவர். இந்ேியோவின் எல்வலப்புற
மோகோெம், ஆப்கோனிஸ்ேோன் என் வற்றில் வோழ்ந்ே மக்கவள 'அவர்கள்' என
அவைப் துண்டு.
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Puunochchimunai. In a similar manner to the story above, the--now "Arabs"--saw smoke rising
from the land and knew people were living there. When the Paddani people arrived, the
Mukkuvars sought their help to fight the Timilars. In exchange for their help, the Mukkuvars
offered as a reward either women, or gold, or land. The Paddani people chose to marry
Mukkuvar women because they wanted to make close blood ties with the Mukkuvars. They
married seven women from seven clans, migrated to where these clans lived, and the Mukkuvars
provided a number of different occupation workers for their service. These groups then were, the
author writes, the first people of Eravur.111
These histories exist here as narratives, traditions, and rumors, and I will argue
throughout this thesis that they also exist and are embodied by individuals and communities
through technologies of ornamentation.
Ethnicized Land
On the ground, many people have strong notions that Tamils should be under Tamil local
governments and Muslims under Muslim local governments. In The Soil of Araiyampathy, K.
Sabaratnam even goes so far as to compare the present situation with that of the partition of India
and Pakistan.112 Much like people conflate 'Araiyampathy' with 'Manmunai Pattu' as 'Tamil,'
many people tend to think of Muslim settlements (within Manmunai Pattu) as 'Kattankudy.'
People assume that Muslim neighborhoods in the Manmunai Pattu District actually follow
Kattankudy'sgovernance politics. These beliefs are not without substantial grounds. For example,
one sign for a Muslim organization located in Manmunai Pattu reads: No. 26 Karbala Nagar,
Kattankudy (Arayampathy). (Even GoogleMaps marks Karbala as a part of Kattankudy.) People
regularly conceive of the Muslim neighborhoods in Araiyampathy as "satellite settlements" of
111
112

Ibid., 4-5.
K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampthy, 29.
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Kattankudy, or inversely describe Kattankudy as the "mother settlement." These sorts of
everyday conflations fuel Tamil anxieties over "encroachments." Spatially, this could look
ominous because the Tamil-majority town of Araiyampathy is now almost completely
"encircled" by Muslim neighborhoods (see Figure 4). K. Sabaratnam writes with strong
suspicion that:
All of these settlements--Kattankudy, concurrently with Karbala, which touches
Palamunai, which is diagonally stretched to Sikaram, which bends to Ollikulam, and
meets in Kankeyanodai--are linked as a series of points. In this method, these settlements
will come to a formation that circles and engulfs Araiyampathy village, and in this, it is
meaningful to suspect a guilty inner motive.113
The new Muslim 'encroachments' have led some to reinterpret old Muslim neighbors as
'encroachers.' Karbala, in particular frequents the news.114 The village is located in the northeast
corner of Manmunai Pattu and was established in 1977 as a Muslim settlement by Dr. Ahmed
Fareed, with the help of Hizbullah's political influence.115 Because the area is at the boundary
between Araiyampathy and Kattankudy, and because it now seems to be home to many Muslim
settlements, Sabaratna writes in his book that the establishment of "this settlement began to add
oil to ignite flames of the Tamil-Muslim ethnic problem that were already existent then as small,
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K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampathy, இக்குடிபயற்றங்கவள பநோக்குமிடத்து கோத்ேோன்குடி;

அேபனோடிவெந்து கர் ோலர்; அ?ேவன ோலமுவனபயோடு கேோடுத்து குறுக்கோக நீட்டி
சிகைம், ஒல்லிக்குளம் என வவளத்து கோங்க்பகயபனோவடயில் சங்கமிக்கும் ஒரு
கேோடர்புள்ளித் கேோடுப்பு முவறயில் அவமந்ேேோக இக்குடிபயற்றங்கள் இருப் ேனோல்
ஆவையம் ேிக் கிைோமத்வேச் கிற்றச்சூழுந்து ஏற் டுத்ேப் ட்டு வரும் இேில்

ோரியகேோரு

உள்பநோக்கம் இருப் ேோக சந்பேகிப் ேில் அர்த்ேமுள்ளது.
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Tambimutthu, “Araiyampathi pithesathil aththumeeri kaanikalai pidiththavarkalai
janaathipathi peci veliyetruven.” Arayampathy News, Oct. 8, 2013.
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minor conflicts."116 Conflict over this area was ongoing during my time there. After the war and
resulting displacement, there is a
significant dispute over landownership in
this area. While I was conducting my
fieldwork, there was a heated controversy
over a Hindu burial ground. A Muslim
man claiming he had the deeds was filing
the case in the courts during the time of
my fieldwork. Mr. Ajmal brought me
maps with records to show that Muslims
had owned this land for at least three
generations. This illuminates the
ethnicization of territory and of beliefs in
Figure 4: Source: Hasbullah and Korf

how governments should represent
peoples.
People also recreate and reinforce these spatial boundaries in rumor, defining and
redefining where they should and shouldn't be. Hasbullah and Korf write of "cartographies of
fear," and there is a certainly something of a geography of rumors that is in some ways informed
by the violence of the past.117 The following examples shed some light on this dynamic:
"How much is this book?" I asked the (Kattankudy) shop owner.
"150 rupees," he said. "You are studying Tamil?" he added with a tone of surprise.
116

Ibid. 29. Original Tamil: இந்ேக் குடிபயற்றம் ஆைம் மோனது கேோடக்கம் ஏற்கனபவ சிறுசிறு

பூசல்களோக நிலவி வந்ே ேமிழ் - முஸ்லீம் இனப் ிைச்சிவன எண்கெய் வோர்க்கப் ட்ட
ேீச்சுவோவலயோக எரிய ஆைம் ித்து விட்டது.
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"Yes, I have come to study," I said.
"You have come alone? Father, mother...?" he probed.
"They are in America. I have come here alone."
"Are you not scared?" he asked, concerned.
"No. Should I be scared?" I asked back.
"Here [in Kattankudy] it's ok. There is no problem. All people here are Muslims, no?
Muslim people will not cause any problem." He told me that if I continued that way [pointing
vaguely south] it is less safe.
"Araiyampathy?" I pressed.
He nodded. "LTTE. They are all Tamils, no? It is not safe."118
On another occasion, I was scolded by a Tamil friend, Nirupama, for visiting Muslim
friends after dark. At a loss for what to say, I commented on how my host-Akka was also angry
with me.
"Yes. Muslims, no? You shouldn't go there. It's not safe." Nirupama warned.
Another neighbor interrupted, "Now there is no problem (piraccanai)."
Nirupama persisted. "We ["nama," inclusive of me] don't go there after dark. You
shouldn't go alone. Fear, no?" She added, "boys," in English. "They will get drugs from Saudi
and those places."119

The spatial references in the rumors subtly construct spaces by drawing upon and
reinforcing ethnic boundaries.
Present Tension as Primarily Based on Land
I, like many of the people I met, consciously--not for lack of importance or material-choose not to delve deeply into the war in this thesis. The war and the immense hardships that
people in the area faced were not ever-present in people's minds, nor were these defining features
of the people I met. Still, such memories inevitably shape the present. Whenever the subject of
the war, or of Tamil-Muslim relations came up, people would almost always tell me that "Now,
there is no problem" (ippō piraccaṉai illai). I at first was puzzled by this statement. It didn't
118
119

Shopowner, conversation recollected in field notes, April 19, 2014.
Nirupama Aunty, conversation recollected in field notes, April 27, 2014.
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seem to always match up with the many communally charged rumors that I was hearing at the
time. However, the statement "now there is no problem" is importantly relative. "Now" is—of
course—better than then, the problem time (piraccaṉai kālam). And in this relativity, this
acknowledgment that now things are better than the hardships of before, there is a tacit
acknowledgment of violence as a shared experience for people irrespective of community.
A main source of tension between Tamils and Muslims today stems from land, and
though the war aggravated this, such land disputes have existed long before. The issue of land
affects people at different levels, with some taking great interest and others little interest at all.
K. Sabaratnam writes in The Soil of Araiyampathy that the disputed settlement of Karbala was
established officially in 1977, when "The start of this colonization began to add oil to ignite the
flames of the Tamil-Muslim ethnic conflict that had already prevailed before as small, minor
conflicts.”120 Similarly, in the interview with Aadhesh, he dated the first encroachments to 1950s
saying that "before 1947 [near independence] most of the area belongs to Tamils.”121 In
constructing my thesis this way, I want to reiterate that I do not mean to downplay the very real
impact that the war had on re-imaginings and solidifications of ethnic relations. Rather, I seek to
demystify and de-romanticize the Tamil-Muslim relationships that existed before it and use that
history to better understand the present situation. While it would be naïve and outright false to
suggest that war and the polarizations that it fostered are not extremely significant and relevant
today, I seek to complicate this by highlighting some continuities. It is often Tamil nationalists
who tend to evaluate the current tensions over land through a filter that preferences the war times
120

K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Araiyampathy, 29 Original Tamil: 1977ம் ஆண்டு அைசியல் ேடம் ேிக்கும்

பநோக்கமோக டோக்டர் அகமது

ரீத் மீ ைோகலப்வ

ோ.உ. அவர்களோல் முன்கனடுக்கப் ட்ட

கேோரு குறுகிய அைசியல் முயற்சியின் அவலச்சின்னம் இது. இந்ேக் குடிபயற்றம்
ஆைம் மோனது கேோடக்கம் ஏற்கனபவ சிறுசிறு பூசல்களோக நிலவி வந்ே ேமிழ் - முஸ்லீம்
இனப் ிைச்சிவன எண்கெய் வோர்க்கப் ட்ட ேீச்சுவோவலயோக எரிய ஆைம் ித்து விட்டது.
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as a key turning point. They are then able to cast Muslim politics today more nicely as a kind of
a betrayal.
It is important to reiterate that most people I have talked to make the distinction that this
problem is not of the same caliber as the tension during the war times. For example, I conducted
an interview with a Tamil man who works at the nearby Ayyanar temple, Yaanujan, along with
both translators Viccu and Chana. I asked a simple and general question: What are the
difficulties for this village? He first responded with the deforestation caused by construction of
houses. He said that it made it harder to live there because there was less shade, so people were
more susceptible to the heat. As my translators were telling me that this was the only problem,
he interrupted and added (with their prompting):
Yaanujan: Also, for Tamils and Muslims there is...
Translator: Fear?
Yaanujan: Yes.
Translator: Ah so that is the problem (piraccaṉai).
Yaanujan: It may be a problem, it may be a complication. (piraccaṉai irukkō, cikkal
irukkō)
Translators describe the land disputes to me unprompted

This distinction between a "problem" (piraccaṉai) and something of relatively lesser
magnitude (here: cikkal) also comes through directly in one of my interviews with my Tamil
teacher K. Sabaratnam:
Me: So what are the biggest problems [for Araiyampathy]?
Sabaratnam: Biggest?
Me: Piraccanai...
Sabaratnam: Piraccanai, piraccanai. Problems. In Araiyampathy...we have problem. The
Muslim problem. By this side, we are having Kattankudy. The whole Kattankudy is
Muslim people. Full of Muslim. Here Araiyampathy full of Hindus. But these people, the
Kattankudy people, have an idea to capture this land. Capture in the sense, engorge,
acquire--our land for their benefit. They wanted to change all the people into Muslim. Or
the Muslim people should by colonized in this area. That is the main idea. That is not
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obvious. Not obvious. Secret. They are doing the works according to this idea. So you
would of heard some days back. We have a beach here. One kilometer. That is uh
confined to our people. These people have now come and occupied that area and make it
a Muslim town. Even the government is supporting them because we are Tamils and
Tamils have no place in the government of Sri Lanka at present.
Me: So how are they colonizing it?
Sabaratnam: Colonizing means they are capturing the land. And they are putting they
are building and bringing Muslim people and make them occupy the place.122
Me: How did they get the land? That is state land. And some people are also selling their
lands to Muslims.
Sabaratnam: That is the problem here. Because of money. If they ask for more money,
they will give. That is our people's bad habit. This is the problem. But as far as
Arayampathy is concerned, we don't have national problem. Nothing problem. Because
national wise, the language problem is there, the ethnic problem is there. That is the
normal problem. But we don't have specialized problem in that. Our important problem is
Muslims. [emphasis added]
Unfortunately this interview was conducted in English, so I didn't get to hear a particular
distinction in word choice like in Yaanujan's interview. However, it is evident in his explanation
that he, like Yaanujan, views the present Tamil-Muslim relations as something less than a
piraccanai like that of the extremely tense war times. Both men, like many others, also highlight
this problem as that based on land disputes. Many Araiyampathy people feel "surrounded" by
Muslim settlements and pressured by Kattankudy's population growth.
Thus, by contextualizing the present tensions in disputes preceding the war--and by
highlighting the important and widely-acknowledged relative harmony implicit in the affirmation
that "now there is no problem"--I seek to highlight the coexistence implicit in the tension. While
the increased segregation of spaces and ethnicization of district governments has played an
122
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important role in separating peoples and polarizing local politics, there also seems to be an
important commitment to the relative peace of the present times. This coexistence, however,
precludes notions of cultural/ethnic coherence, which seems to have been more prominent before
the war more severely segregated people. Tamil people would often tell me that "now there is no
problem" because Muslim people will "come and go.”123 Implicit in this is notion of 'coming and
going' are notions of belonging and of otherness. Others are free to come and then go because
there is peace, but they do not belong there.
In this way, the violence of the past can be importantly conceived as something of a
shared experience for people living at this border. This is meant to complicate literature reducing
histories of violence as primarily divisive and "othering" and to reject outright notions of
violence as a continuation of everyday politics.124 The latter view is highly problematic in its
implication that violence is an innate quality that leads to "natural" fruition in violent acts. I build
on Laura Ring's insightful ethnographic work on everyday peace-building in Karachi that argues
that "peace is an outflow of our distinctly human capacity for sociality; that peace lies in a
maintenance of tension, not in its discharge."125 I argue for an approach that also understands
violence as a shared experience that can build a conscious commitment to peaceful coexistence.
My fieldwork on ornament and public beautification (Chapters Two and Three) shows, however,
that such a history does not necessarily create coherence. A tacit precondition to any ideas of
"coexistence" is that people are working with notions of distinct entities/imaginaries of
"otherness." Nonetheless, without reifying "otherness," I suggest that it is not inherently
123
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incompatible with peace. Ring quotes Briggs' point that "opposition and antagonism may coexist
with and even help to construct systems of peace and nonviolence."126 I often would notice that
when people intentionally avoided discussing politics or conflict or tension, they would switch to
talking about "cultural differences.”127 A subtle point that this thesis puts forward (albeit
hesitantly, and with much room for development and critique) is that material exchanges play an
important role in deflecting particular tensions over authenticity while engaging in peaceful
dialectics.
Sufi-Tawheedi Disputes
This point--of cultural and ornamental dialectics maintaining fairly stable relationships of
coexistence--is important in illustrating another important tension in theses villages: a so-called
'intra-ethnic' tension between Sufis and primarily Towheedi groups. When I moved just a few
lanes away from the boundary road, conversations about Tamil-Muslim relations rarely came up.
I argue that this is more than coincidental. It illuminates the ground reality that Muslims aren't
too concerned with Tamils (in spite of Tamil anxieties for Muslim political economic eminence
and population expansion). Instead, there are other--more pressing--problems in Kattankudy that
126
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come to the fore. Namely, that many Towheedi and other Muslims deem certain Sufi practices
and beliefs to be outside of Islam. To over-simply a larger and theologically more complicated
debate—and to emphasize why a material culture study is perhaps particularly productive in
exploring it further—a few people have referred to this problem as an uruvam piraccaṉai, or a
problem over form/shape.128 This controversy extends to many Sufi beliefs and practices such as
the keeping and venerating of tomb-shrines (ziaram), the making of vows, and the hosting of
large kantoori feasts. While these Sufis in no sense conceive of themselves as 'Hindu' and defend
these practices as in the tradition of the Prophet, opponents see these practices as similar or the
same as Hindu practices. I would suggest that such perceived ambiguity threatens the balance of
tension in cultural exchanges that many Muslims have historically worked to establish so as to
secure a distinct racial identity from Tamils.
There is one major ziaram within the borders of Kattankudy inside the Badhriya Jumma
Mosque that identifies as "Sunnat Wal Jamaat" and is led by Rauf Moulavi. Just south of
Kattankudy's official border (though unofficially considered to be within Kattankudy) is the All
Ceylon Thareekathul Mufliheen headquarters, meditation center, and founder's ziaram. Though
these two groups are commonly lumped together as "Sufi" by scholars and as "kafr" by opposing
Muslims--and despite the fact that these two groups have shared some connections and
sympathies in the past--many people within these communities view the other as distinct.
Members of the Thareekathul Mufliheen spoke strongly against the shrine veneration carried out
in Badhriya while my major contact with Badhriya said of Thareekathul Mufliheen, "They were
with us in the beginning, but now no.”129
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Tensions between these two Sufi groups and other so-called reformist groups
predominantly under the umbrella term of "Tawheed Jamaat" have escalated since the mid1970s. Rauf Moulavi was excommunicated from Islam by the All Ceylon Jammiyathul Ulama
in 1979130 after giving a speech that others describe as saying that "God is in
everything...everything is in God."131 One Badhriya member told me the debate intensified on
the nature of the Prophet as embodied in the issue of whether the Prophet had wet dreams. Rauf
Moulavi told that the Prophet did not have wet dreams because of his special nature. This dispute
on the nature of the Prophet was the first official source of conflict in the Muslim community of
the area, and this conflict festers very much so today. Before arriving in Kattankudy, Payilvan,
too, was excommunicated by the local ulema in his hometown in Maruthamunai.132
Badhriya supporters have faced violent persecution multiple times. Many Sufis suffered
displacement into Araiyampathy after the destruction of their homes, grenade attacks, and
shootings.133 Rauf Moulavi survived an attempted assassination in the office room opposite his
mosque in 2006/7 in which there were bullet holes in the back the chair he was sitting in--a
miracle and now a testament to his special nature as a wali. He fled to India near Ajmer Sharif
and has cultivated important ties with this shrine. On December 12th, 2006, a crowd of people
attacked the Thareekathul Mufliheen ziaram and meditation center of Sheihul Mufliheen M.S.M.
denouncing the Badhriya leader Rauf Moulavi. See The Whiplash of Truth to Bid’ah by Sultan ul Arifin Sheihul
Mufliheen M.S.M Abdullah (Rah), http://www.mufliheen.org/Content/Attachment/Book/Pdf/The-Whiplash-oftruth-to-BidAh.pdf.
130
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Abdullah(Rah) (also known as "Payilvan," or "wrestler")located at the southern Kattankudy
border in Manmunai Pattu.134 The attack was systematic, planned, and clearly intended for ends
that extend beyond the act itself. People brought heavy-duty equipment to destroy the beautiful
minaret, and they also brought video equipment. After the incident, the footage was even sold in
Kattankudy on DVD.135 The body of Abdul Payilvan was exhumed and burnt like, as one
contact put it, "like a Hindu." These instances of violence are an important dynamic in
Kattankudy, and they also illustrate how an important component of tension here is negotiated in
polemic terms of being either kafr "Hindu" or "true" Muslim.
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Chapter Two: Personal Beautification
As soon I arrived home after a long walk from a friend's place on the other side of
Kattankudy, I immediately removed the black shawl draped across my chest and arms and went
to wash off the dust and sweat. Feeling refreshed, my host-sister Wasma and I relaxed and
watched a new Bollywood film--the finicky internet connection and ignorance of Hindi
notwithstanding.
At around 5:00, I spread out my green saree and started to quickly iron out some of the
wrinkles. Wasma looked a little puzzled.
"You're going to tie a saree?" she asked me. She had never seen me wear one before.
"Yeah, there's a function at the temple, and my friends told me that I should wear a
saree," I explained. The previous day they had gently rebuked me for wearing a relatively casual
shalwar kameez.
It was the second week of June--here, part of a vibrant Hindu temple festival season. I
had just moved out of Raji Akka's house on the boundary road and in with my new Muslim
Aunty a couple lanes deep into Kattankudy. Just down the road in Araiyampathy, the Kanagi
Amman temple was celebrating the annual Door-Opening Grand Festival (tirukkatavu tiṟattal
tiruviḻā) one of the biggest local festivals of the year.
I put on the underskirt and blouse. I tied a tiny knot in the corner that I then tucked into
the underskirt. I was in the process of wrapping and tucking the appropriate length into the
underskirt when my Aunty came home. I assured her I knew how to tie it--I had never seen her
or her sisters ever wear a saree. I also, of course, had heard a lot of rumors that Muslims don't
know how to tie sarees.
But, she came in to check on me again and looked interested, so I asked her if she wanted
to tie it for me. She gladly agreed. I immediately noticed that she didn't have the speed or grace
that comes with constant practice. She also didn't fold the pleats in the typical way using the
finger trick, the pollu that hangs off of the left shoulder was much shorter than I had ever seen it
before. Nonetheless, she knew what she was doing. All in all, the saree was on, and it looked
pretty good, which is most of the battle. As I was leaving, she half-jokingly suggested I wear a
bindi (pottu in Tamil), but then laughed and said that they would probably give me one when I
got there.
I arrived at the Kannagi Amman temple a bit early. I waited in the sand until my friend
Saratha Akka and her sister-in-law arrived. They approved of my saree. Did I tie it myself? they
wondered. I explained that my Aunty tied it.
"A Muslim tied it?! It's not bad! It's neat. Muslims don't usually tie sarees," Saratha Akka
exclaimed, a look of surprise dancing across her face. Then they noticed the pollu and
commented how it was too short.
"But where are your bangles?" Saratha's sister-in-law asked suddenly.
"I usually don't wear them." I didn't really care for bangles. They can hurt and make a lot
of noise.
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You should really wear bangles. I am going to buy you some [from one of the many tiny
shops selling just about everything]."
I assured her that wasn't necessary, and I had thoughtlessly brought just enough rupees to
give to the woman watching over my shoes. Both Saratha Akka and her sister-in-law agreed that,
if I had bangles, it would be perfect. I repeatedly assured them that I would wear bangles next
time. But, when Saratha Akka went to buy snacks for her children, she came back with two light
green plastic bangles in an attempt to match my green saree.
Aside from a few "key informant" interviews, most of my (especially female) friends and
people I met in passing seemed reluctant to discuss these political matters directly. I also avoided
asking directly as a methodological point. When issues did come up in conversation, people
would often deflect any questions, shrug off any kind of tension, or stress that "You don't want to
get involved in politics." But, when people wouldn't speak about ethnic tensions directly, they
would almost always feel freer to discuss cultural differences such as ornament, ritual, and food.
Raji Akka consistently and aggressively downplayed any ideas of tension between Tamils and
Muslims. Because I lived with her and knew her better, I would ask her more direct questions.
On one occastion while we were walking down the boundary road past a Pillaiyar (Ganesha)
Temple, I asked her if there was ever any problem with Muslims complaining about the temple
bells.136 She immediately replied, "Chi! It is not like that!"137 and I immediately felt ashamed for
asking such a question. But she would discuss without hesitation the differences in diet, dress,
and festivals. As I mentioned in the introduction, she even encouraged me to change my
greetings and dress when speaking with her Muslim friends, though she didn't practice these
changes herself.
I gradually began to understand that these cultural exchanges and explicit deflections of
tension were in fact highly political themselves once we complicate misogynist notions of what
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is "public." Laura Ring faces a similar realization in her work with women and neighborliness in
a Karachi apartment. She writes that domestic spaces, far from being a private sphere 'restricted'
to women, are "sites of political processes, not just of gendered and generational conflict but of
class, ethnic, racial, and national struggles."138 Ring conceives of the zenana as a public space
and recovers the agency and politics behind her neighbors' actions in actively constructing 'peace'
amid ethnic tension.
With a more material culture and corpothetics approach, I, too, am claiming the
feminized 'space' of ornament and of beauty as important public modalities. It is perhaps
distinctively evident in diverse boundary areas like this one that what you decide to wear in the
morning and how you wear it is an intrinsically and simultaneously personal, social, political,
religious, and ethnic act. Here, beauty and ornaments are both axiomatic technologies.
Ornaments simultaneously construct and constitute 'authentic' identity. People use ornaments to
cultivate certain identities while excluding others. This aspect of "beauty" is so integral, that I
would suggest that the term, "beauty," itself has prescriptive and normalizing connotations.
Literature Review
Even though some scholars explicitly recognize common, everyday materials such as
jewelry to be significant, the number of thorough studies on these is very few. Thus, I will be
exploring personal beautification in this chapter. Arthur Danto notes that it is deceptively easy to
view 'beautification' and 'cosmetics' in what he describes as a "Third Realm"of beauty that is in
between the "natural" and the "artistic." It is concerned with processes of beautification. He
notes that "Third Realm" beauty has been marginalized in philosophical discourse despite its
predominance in everyday life. "In this realm, things are beautiful only because they were
beautified--and beautification has perhaps seemed, to a puritanical philosophical consciousness,
138
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to be—the term is Hegel's—unworthy of philosophical attention. Morality has always been of
central philosophical concern, but discussions of manners, which Hobbes sneers at as "small
morals," have been barely noticed.139 He suggests that "perhaps nothing cosmetic is without
meaning."140 While Danto importantly urges us to look at beautification as not just "mere"
beautification, Daniel Miller further complicates ideas of not just what beautification signifies,
but how it is an important constructor of meaning with his critique of 'depth ontology.’ He sees a
problem with 'semiotics' theories in that they "presume a certain relationship between the interior
and exterior.141 He challenges the assumption that "being--what we truly are--is located deep
inside ourselves and is in direct opposition to the surface.”142 Thus, the "self" is something
constantly in flux, constantly changing, constantly accumulating via our surroundings.
David Morgan highlights that "The habitus is not situated above the clouds but in the
memory, in the body of each social actor.”143 He sees the cultivating of individuals and
collectives as continual processes of somatic engagement with two primary ways of seeing: (1)
to be seen as a member of community, meaning similar appearance, and (2) to see others and the
world in the way of the community.144 Also drawing on by Bourdieu, Miller writes that "much
of what we are exists not through our consciousness or body, but as an exterior environment that
habituates and prompts us." He also notes the etic implications of an object's tendency to appear
obscure; anthropologists have dismissed material culture studies as missing the point--missing
humanity. Justin McDaniel states that "instead of studying images individually as symbols of
Buddhist virtues, as vehicles or meaning, or representative of certain stylistic developments, I am
139
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interested in how images participate in the social construction of reality.145 I also am interested
in treating ornaments not in and of themselves, but as participants in society and as embodiments
of constructed reality.
Speaking of affect theory, Melissa Gregg finds that "With affect, a body is as much
outside itself as in itself--webbed in its relations--until ultimately such firm distinctions cease to
matter."146 She notes that intersections between affect and aesthetics "not what something is, but
how it is."147 While affect theory only indirectly and tangentially applies to this thesis, in this
chapter I am looking at how people negotiate what is "authentic" and what is "other" through
ornaments. Without sinking into the dangerous trap of taking everything to be 'symbolic' and
therein 'exotifying' the people concerned in this thesis, I argue with those suggesting that 'beauty'
merits study in and of itself. This argument has merits in drawing attention to beauty as a salient
value in society. However, it ultimately threatens to entrench the feminization-marginalization of
beauty, ornament, decoration, etc. by compartmentalizing these as distinct from other, more
'practical' or 'political', concerns. I seek to combine feminist, material culture, and some affect
theory to explore lived implications for a now widely popular approach of 'embodied'
engagement with the world.
Conceptions of Beauty
At any given time, particular idioms of beauty are salient. However, there are important-and often multifaceted--dialogues between norms and individuality, society and self, structural
and actor agency. Justin McDaniel moves away ever slightly from Bourdieu's habitus and uses
the Ilana Sibler's idea of "repertoires" to emphasize individual actor agency in choosing from her
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specific repertoire that is publicly informed, where "Culture in this sense is a dialogue between
people who draw on different repertoires informed by often shared technologies as well as harder
to define beliefs."149 Individuals negotiate their own personal fashions within salient idioms-recreating beauty ideals by affirming or subverting them. People embody, perform, and
negotiate this dialectic in everyday life. This chapter focuses on how personal, embodied
ornaments from nose piercings to ways of drinking can negotiate particularly socio-ethnic pasts
and presents.
Other works such as The Grace of the Four Moons and Visibly Muslim: Fashion, Politics,
Faith illustrate the complexity of individual choices and rationales. Sukla and Tarlo
(respectively) provide rich details and insights into the negotiation of these idioms from within
particular communities with the explicit purpose to complicate idioms by emphasizing various
personal choices. This thesis focuses slightly more generally on boundaries and their negotiation.
This particular chapter looks at how individuals create beauty while embodying and negotiating
fluid standards for their communities. Therefore, while this thesis privileges the negotiation of
the communal, it is worth reiterating that something as fluid and salient as 'beauty' can never be
accurately reduced to community imaginaries. While beauty plays an important role in
constituting and negotiating oppositional and ethnic understandings, beauty also operates to
express individual style, taste, and skill. For example, clothing here is very frequently custommade with elements of artistic and creative expression. Wasma practiced sewing her own
shalwar, and my friend Shani picked out beautiful fabrics and left very specific and unique
instructions with the tailor. Many women in Kattankudy buy iron-on jewels and design their own
abaya embellishments, and the choices of jewelry and other accessories is highly varied. There
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are countless permutations, nuances, and contradictions to personal design outside the scope of
this thesis.
There are also certain fluid yet sticky holistic conceptions of beauty and ornamentation in
an appropriate sense. For example, on some occasions, I would ask friends if there was any
particular color associated with their religion, and if so, what colors they associated with other
religions. People tended to focus on a particular idiom of beauty/or ornament when responding.
For example, my Aunty focused on architecture and told me that for Muslims green was
important because a lot of the mosques were green (which is seen as "cooling" for eyes), Hindus
used red and yellow in their temples, and Buddhist viharas were white. My friend Shani
responded focusing on the wedding sarees: Hindus red, Christians white, and Sinhalese usually
white, too. Another friend, Shalini, looked to the color of the clothing worn by lay devotees,
suggesting that Hindus had no particular color, Buddhists and Christians were white, and
Muslims preferred black.
These conceptions are not merely gossiped about--though gossip is extremely salient in
its own right and intimately intertwined with ornaments and other public constructors. These
conceptions are also frequently--both in the present and historically--codified through text,
ordinance, and ritual. A famous example of this is the Indian Deoband figure Ashraf Ali
Thanawi's book Bhishti Zewar, literally meaning "Heavenly Ornaments." In this, Thanawi
identifies a number of customs in the public spaces of women, including adornment, warning
that these customs have become like shariah and should be substituted with what he perceives to
be the "True" shariah.150
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Beauty as Piety Embodied
Based on my brief fieldwork in both Madurai and in Sri Lanka, I would thus like to pose
two main distinctions to notions of beauty that often operate simultaneously. One refers to a
particular something that is beautiful, like a saree or pair of earrings or a skin tone. The other
refers to a more general idea of beauty that is more conservative in nature and intimately
connected to ideas of piety and community. For example, while women in Kattankudy are
encouraged to dress modestly and avoid drawing attention to their beauty, people describe
abayas--paradoxically intended at some levels to conceal beauty—as "beautiful." Similarly, my
friend Subo was describing to me the word maṅkaḷam, which roughly translates to
"auspiciousness," which in a Hindu context is associated with elaborate systems of dates, times,
rituals, etc. Rather than give me a particular definition, she described it very specifically as an
Indian girl wearing white jasmine flowers (mallihai pū) in her hair, a saffron-colored (kāvi)
saree, gold bangles (taṅka vaḷaiyal), particular gold earrings (jimikki), a bindi (pottu), and silver
anklets (veḷḷi kolucu). This is largely unachievable here because jasmine flowers are not common
in this area. (Also interesting, in this conception, Subo positions the epitome of auspiciousness
not in Sri Lanka, but in India.) Nonetheless it remains an important living conception of how
things "should" be. Subo describes a traditional and conservative definition of beauty, as
opposed to many of the trendier fashions that she herself wears such as silver jewelry and soft
pastel colors.
I also discussed maṅkaḷam with an "expert" who worked for Sri Lanka's Department of
Hindu and Cultural Affairs who explained to me in detail maṅkaḷam in a very similar way to
Subo's image of it:
K: I have a doubt about maṅkaḷam. If you say 'maṅkaḷam,' I don't think it translates well
in English.
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Another woman: [interjecting] With pottu, maṅkaḷam, without pottu, amaṅkalam.
Cultural "expert": Having kept a pottu...if you want to say maṅkaḷam in the Saiva
tradition, [it is] tying up/combing hair, putting a garland (maalai), keep a pottu, wear
earrings, clothed in decorative saffron color clothes, flowers in hair; a maṅkaḷa girl needs
to be complete (niṟaivāṉa). This is aitīkam. If you want to understand a complete girl,
you should know this. [She] ties a saree, ties gold coins across forehead, puts a nose ring-this is all identity (aṭaiyāḷam) for girls.
Thus, when I first asked the Cultural Affairs expert, I could tell that she also didn't know
a particular definition of maṅkaḷam. Rather, evident from the description she gave, she was
speaking from a mental image that primarily consisted of ornamentation rather than any kind of
memorized doctrine. Indeed, the other woman present also conceived of it ornamentally and
described it in term of "pottu," Tamil for bindi. The Cultural Affairs expert also presented me a
copy of a booklet about maṅkaḷa tarma, explaining to me examples of maṅkaḷam in rituals in the
home and temples. In this, she elaborated on the nature of particular rituals. One example is that
in Hindu ritual, curved lines like bananas and certain leaves should be presented so that they
open downwards. If they curve upwards, they are amaṅkalam. So, when offering bananas on a
plate to a deity, the bananas should curve downwards in the upside-down 'U' way. Nonetheless,
this understanding of maṅkaḷam was not widely found amongst my friends. For example, on one
occasion while preparing a table of offerings at Nisha Aunty's home for when the procession of
Mari Amman came round. Though it was Nisha Aunty's home, she deferred the
responsibility/honor of preparing the table to Teacher, another neighbor, who presumably had
either greater knowledge or prestige and so was left to do the honors of preparing the table
appropriately. Teacher prepared the table with a certain command, deftly and precisely arranging
the elements of the kumpam ālālam. However, when looking back at photos from this event, I
noticed the bananas were placed curve-up, amaṅkalam.
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This brief discussion of maṅkalam illustrates how conceptions of "beautiful" can refer to
fluid conceptions of standards of "correctness," in a general and normative sense. In Tamil there
are a few other words describing what I have come to understand as ways people or deities
"should" be. One is the word aitīkam, which came up during my fieldwork on street temples in
Madurai and above in the interview with the expert in the Hindu Religious and Cultural Affairs
Department.151When I asked several people about this word, I realized that it had many different
specific meanings; however, in aggregate I understand the word to mean generally a conception
of "correctness," "traditional," "appropriate," or "standard." Ulo Valk says aitīkam is a "synthetic
concept" refering to "religious lore in the broadest sense" including "traditional stories, songs,
beliefs about deities, and relevant customs and rights.”152 It means a traditional way of seeing
culture. Importantly, aitīkam is not written. In the case of the street temples I encountered, this
word was used mostly in reference to the manner of decoration, alaṅkāram, of deities as well as
the manner in which rituals were done. Non-Brahmin pujaris were preparing the alaṅkāram of
deities in ways that "looked right" and in a way that was "beautiful." A supporter of one street
temples said of the alaṅkāram of the Vinayagar murti (deity in physical form), "According to
aitīkam there are a certain conditions/rules. We don't know a lot of that, so God accepts
whichever way we do it. It looks good. Just like we do makeup. If we do it well there is
satisfaction [manutirupti] for the gods if we do alaṅkāram like we do for ourselves.
Manutirupti."153 The pujari therefore ate breakfast before the puja, used everyday materials such
as cooking turmeric and milk bought at the tiny corner shop, and applied an alaṅkāram
according to the pujari's and his aesthetic tastes. They were recreating essentially what they

151
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thought Brahmin priests did, but, without Brahmanic training, ended up doing what seemed
beautiful in the end.
When many of my Muslim friends used the word "beautiful" to describe dress and
ornaments, there was a certain sense of "correctness" and certainly of "appropriateness" in dress
that ties to beauty and is negotiated through ornament. One day I visited my close associate,
Shibly Sir, and his family for Eid lunch wearing a full burqa with the common niqab. My
associate's wife, Basmillah, was thrilled by the change in my dress and said I looked "beautiful"
and "super." Then she said, "Now all you need to do is take out the nose ring--then it will be ok."
This was not the first time I had heard of this, the implication being that nose rings were a
Tamil/Hindu--therefore not a Muslim--custom. Shibly Sir quickly said that that wasn't necessary,
and he assured me that in Islam it was okay to have one. This small discrepancy illuminates the
"vernacular"--or perhaps better put, "embodied" or "lived"--aspect of ornament as well as
continuing to show the everyday salience of these repertoires. Because, regardless of what Shibly
Sir and others may assert is within the doctrine of Islam, I neither met nor saw a single Muslim
woman in Kattankudy who had a nose piercing. On one occasion when chatting with an elderly
woman, she commented on my nose-piercing and asked me if I pierced it in Sri Lanka. I told her
that I had pierced it in Madurai. She told me matter-of-factly that she had once had a nosepiercing. But, when her would-be husband came to the peṇ pārkka (viewing-of-the-girl
ceremony before engagement/marriage), he left instructions for her to remove it, which she did.
This brief discussion of ritual ornamentation, alaṅkāram, the amaṅkalam kumpam
ālālam, and beauty (aḻaku) illuminate how in many ways beauty embodies and negotiates
religiosity. In these instances, it is at many levels these fluid yet salient conceptions of 'beauty' in
a normative sense that negotiate everyday realities and conceptions of identity. Religiosity
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becomes simultaneously negotiated through and embodied by ornaments and 'mere appearances.'
There is an 'openness' to idioms of beauty/ornament specifically, and materiality more generally,
that permits them to embody and negotiate tensions of creation and destruction, affirmation and
opposition, creativity and conformity in seemingly paradoxical meanings.
Kattankudy Transformations
With respect to the new 'Muslim' styles of dress, Kattakudy is--at least presently-distinguished from Muslim communities in other parts of the country. While living Kandy, I
even knew a Muslim woman who regularly tied a saree in a traditional Tamil-style without using
the pollu to cover her head. Many women in Kattankudy view expressions of beauty as a way to
express personal piety. One friend who used to live in Colombo told me, "Here is very decent.
Colombo it is not like that. In Colombo they will put their T-shirt and denim and a hijab. Are
they Muslim? But they dress to show [off] to everyone. They will style their hair and color their
lips. That is all not right. Here it is not like that. Compared to Colombo here is better."154
As mentioned previously, many scholars of Sri Lanka's Muslims and locals alike have
noted the changes in dress, ritual, eating, and other habits that many have undergone gradually in
the Eastern Province since around the mid-late 1970s. Kattankudy in particular, which has a
strong Tawhid Jamaat presence, is known for being a particularly strict and conservative place
for dress--among other notable aspects such as the island's premier madrasas. Here, young
women frequently wear niqab, a piece worn with abaya and hijab that covers the face except for
an opening at the eye. My Aunty liked to show me photos of her going to grade school in a
Catholic uniform with knees, arms, and hair exposed. She said that in those days that was simply
how it was. Then, Muslims also used to wear sarees and tie them slightly differently so that they
could cover their head with the pollu. Now, her daughter Wasma wears a white hijab uniform
154
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covering everything except her face. When Wasma walks to school, she also wears a black
niqab. Moreover, only the older generation regularly wears sarees, and—like in the chapter's
opening anecdote—there are stereotypes about how Muslims don't know how to tie sarees.155
Many Muslims describe the gradual and now popular understanding of Muslim dress to
be a process of (re)discovery. While looking the wedding album of one of my friends, I noticed
that guests were holding plates of flowers up to the couple as they sat in a manner very much
reminiscent of the aarati plates at Hindu weddings. When I asked her what this ritual was, her
face became noticeably embarrassed and quickly turned the page as she told me "We don't do
like this anymore. In Islam it is wrong [piḻai]."156 As the politician Azeez argued at the turn of
the twentieth century, "...of the Arab settlers some had their Arabian wives with them and others
converted and married Tamil women as it was with the Tamils, who were then called Malabars,
that the Arabs came in contact. The entire cessation of intercourse with their own country, made
the Arabs to adapt themselves to their surroundings, and they gradually adopted the language,
customs, habits and manners of the people (Tamil) amongst whom they had settled...."157 Most
people told me before that people simply "didn't know" about these customs while others assert
that people had "forgotten" over time and were in a sense recovering these traditions.158
However, not all Muslims see all of these changes as a positive process of "rediscovery."
Dr. Ameer Ali finds them polarizing and "unfortunate." "Muslims who went [to the Middle East]
for job opportunities came back with a different mindset, influenced by the religious perception
of the Saudis and other neighbouring countries. Unfortunately, this resulted in Muslims in this
country isolating themselves from the mainstream society, in terms of their dress, their values
155

There are exceptions to this. The most common are brides who wear sarees on their wedding day and some
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Basmillah, recollected from field notes, May 24, 2014.
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and their practices."159 Indeed, supporters of the Sufi Badhriya Jumma Mosque (discussed
above) also trace the introduction of "Wahhabism" to Sri Lanka to around the same time that
people note these changes in dress, in the late 1970s. In one bayan, the leader of the Badhriya
community, Rauf Moulavi, laments a particular chant/prayer called taḷapāttiyam during late
pregnancy popular twenty-five or thirty years ago, which has since been eradicated because of
the 'Wahhabis.' He defended this tradition as coming from the Prophet himself.160 In terms of
dress, though, the position of Sufi women is more ambiguous and merits further study. During
the four months I was there, I did notice that women attending Badhriya Jumma Mosque were
less likely to wear abaya even in highly public places today. On one occasion, I visited
Kattankudy beach with my Aunty. The beach is a popular public place for holidays, so, like in
the case of shopping on the main road, many women tend to wear abaya. I ran into a family I
knew from Badhriya at the beach one day wearing brightly colored shalwars with the dupatta
wrapped around their heads. Moreover, when I attended the mosque's 28th Annual Kwajajee
Grand Feast, most of the women were wearing shalwars or even sarees. I mentioned this to my
host-sister Wasma, who immediately responded "They [Badhriya-goers] are just like that. That is
not our culture.”161 Still, my main contact from Badhriya Jumma Mosque defended the more
strict observance of fardah and encouraged me to observe it. Thus, this is likely widely
negotiated in diverse ways and shifting in the current tension of the times; more evidence is
needed to engage in any kind of productive analysis of Sufi personal adornment. Due to the
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nature of my evidence and the scope of this chapter, I therefore must privilege the "reformist"
Muslim perspectives to beauty and ornament.
Transnationalized Authenticity: Real and Rumored Political Economies of Beauty
The most obvious political economy is that of clothes and fabrics. When it comes to
churidar and shalwar kameez, India is widely conceived of as the place of the highest quality
fabrics and workwomanship.162 While traveling in public, going shopping, walking to school, or
visiting friends, the vast majority of Muslims in Kattankudy will wear abayas in what they see as
a Gulf style. They are sleek and black, which tends to contrast the vibrant colors of shalwars
worn by others. Indeed, in "black" is considered by many Hindus to be amaṅkalam When I went
shopping for abayas, I was given two basic options for fabric type: (1) a thinner, lighter, more
synthetic and expensive material advertised as "from Dubai," and (2) a thicker, heavier, clothier
and cheaper material advertised as "from India." While I have had little success in tracking trade
and business records retroactively.163 I also heard from two key contacts that Kattankudy was a
significant exporter of abayas to Dubai and other countries. One man jokingly told me that
Kattankudy ships abayas to Dubai and then imports them back, marketing them as Arabian
fashions.164 This interestingly (1) acknowledges the salience of 'Arabness', (2) simultaneously
calls into question this form of authenticity, and (3) positions Kattankudy as an important center
(economically and as a center for Muslim garments and fashion) within a larger global Muslim
imaginary.
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Interestingly, I also heard on occasion rumors that Tamils were the best seamstresses. For example, when my
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in Batticaloa town because “Tamils will sew churidars well.” I personally happened to know three Muslim
seamstresses while I knew of only one Tamil seamstress in the area. But many women can sew basic repairs,
sleeves, and simple gowns on their own.
163
Alibaba, the new Chinese online retail and trade marketplace, lists a number of abayas listed as “Middle Eastern”
region yet manufactured in Sri Lanka. More research is necessary.
164
Shibly Sir, recollected from field notes May 24, 2014.
May 2015 Final Paper, 2014-2015 Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Fellowship, Penn Humanities Forum
Kimberly Kolor, SAS 2015, University of Pennsylvania

Page 73

I would also often visit jewelry shops and ask to see particular designs. Just like clothing
trends--while it may not be often spoken about directly--some designs are clearly 'Muslim,' some
are 'Hindu,' some are 'Christian,' some are 'Buddhist,' and some are not group-specific.
Occasionally the shopkeepers would tell me that a particular ring or earring design was just in
from Saudi Arabia. For example, one such design involved tiny, bead or chain-like strings that
dangled from earrings or rings. This particular fashion was very common amongst many of my
Muslim friends.
Embodying Opposition: The Space of Nails
The bodily space of nails is useful in lluminating the oppositional aspect of beauty.
Women notice nails, and they frequently ornament them. This is perhaps not mind-blowing or
context specific. However, I want to suggest that things get more interesting in this specific
context, if it is but a subtle interchange. My ambiguous positioning amongst the residents of this
area embodies and illuminates the role of nail polish in social interactions.
One day, when I was spending a lazy afternoon with my friends from Catholic church,
"Maami" showed me how nice her nails looked with the fresh coat of pink that she had just given
them. Wouldn't my nails look nice with that same shade? Sure, I said. She then had her daughter
Shani apply it.
When I went to my (now Kattankudy) home after spending that afternoon with Maami
and Shani, I started to realize that perhaps now my painted nails were a bit out of place. I had
never seen anyone in this house with nail polish on before. It was Afia, the adorable two-year-old
girl who lived next door, who first spotted them. She was staring intently at my fingernails while
were playing and showed Aunty the "colors."
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"Ah, [Kim] has put cutex," Aunty noticed. She asked me when I painted them. I related
the above story, now feeling somewhat sheepish.
"They really wanted to paint them," I lamely offered, almost as an excuse for a misdeed.
Later that night, as my host-sister Wasma and I were chatting before falling asleep, I
learned that my suspicions constituted, in fact, a valid conception here. She told me that we
shouldn't put nail polish because it was haram. Why? I asked. She said, "People say they put pig
parts in the cutex."165 She added that it would be especially bad if when you eat (with fingers
painted with nail polish) you get pieces of it in your mouth. This last part is based on a common
understanding of nail polish or henna that I had seen even amongst some of my Hindu friends in
India who chose not to paint their right hands because the chemicals could be eaten. However,
this idea of nail polish being 'haram', though new to me, didn't really surprise me at the time. I
had long noticed that the Muslim women I had seen did not wear nail polish. In fact, in the entire
six months I spent in Sri Lanka, I did not see one Muslim woman wear nail polish.
There is virtually no scholarship on Islam and nail polish. Instead, I turned to an
admittedly limited survey of online forums and anecdotal data from friends and colleagues.
Nonetheless, it becomes evident that 'nail polish as unconditionally haram' is not a widely
conceived idea. The "typical Muslim" objection to nail polish is that it is not permeable and
therefore prevents the ritual wudu washing before prayers.166 So, many Muslim women in other
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Wasma, recollected from field notes, June 11, 2014.
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countries viewing nail polish as preventing full wudu will either (1) wear nail polish for short
periods of time like between the Isha'a and Fajr prayers, and/or (2) only wear nail polish when
they are menstruating.167 Some women disregard these notions altogether and wear nail polish
regularly. Others reject nail polish unequivocally on grounds that adornment feeds vanity and/or
is used to attract men. It is worth emphasizing that there are of course many different diverse and
complex rationales for nail polish and other beauty practices that transcend these motivations.
However, it is interesting to note that in this area, the choice to wear nail polish—something that
ethnic Tamils, both Hindus and Christians, regularly do—has been taken away by being
denounced as containing pork, which is universally problematic in Islam.
This abstinence from nail polish does not mean that Muslim women in Kattankudy
necessarily prefer natural nails. Wasma told me that instead of nail polish, we could use henna
(maruthaani) to dye our fingernails. In fact, she was a henna enthusiast and did henna for herself
and others all the time. She was always saving newspaper clippings with different patterns and
practicing new designs. One of her dream jobs, she said, was to work in a beauty shop as a henna
artist. And she was not alone--many other Muslims girls our age that I knew were also budding
henna artists. In an interesting parallel to the above story about the English teacher and the nail
polish, a girl I met only once briefly
wanted to do henna for me so that I
would remember her. As women did
henna for more and more friends, they
http://www.islamhelpline.net/node/5674.; “How new ‘breathable’ mail polish for Muslim women is flying off
shelves-but the death of its creator means he will never live to see its success,” Daily Mail UK, Feb. 27, 2013,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2285544/How-new-breathable-nail-polish-Muslim-women-flyingshelves--death-creator-means-live-success.html.
167
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Figure 5, Source: author.
wearing nail polish and wiping over it in case of necessity,” Islam Question and Answer,
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could gain reputations as particularly skilled artists. Wasma was particularly enthusiastic about
henna, and she often used the neighboring children mercilessly as her practice-dummies. Then,
her neighbors would come to her if they wanted to have henna done for some occasion, or simply
just because they wanted it.
In my whole time staying in the area, I only ever had my henna done by Muslim friends.
I also never saw anyone who wasn't Muslim ever wearing henna, with one exception: when a
Tamil friend from campus visited my home in Kattankudy and fell victim to Wasma's henna
addiction. This is not to say that only Muslims wear henna here, but to suggest that it was an
activity distinctly associated with cultivating 'Muslimness'. This is further supported by the fact
that each time someone did my henna (at least 5 times), without fail one of my Tamil friends
would ask me if it was a Muslim girl that had done it for me. Somehow, it seems, this particular
ornamentation has become ethnically/religious coded, perhaps alongside nail polish. Perhaps
incidentally--though I suspect not--all of the young girls and women who did maruthaani for me
used a more expensive purple-dye version that came in plastic tubes with Arabic writing on
them.168
Black Abayas
In the local context, dress also is inescapably viewed in an oppositional light. The
prevalence of black color abayas in Kattankudy is perhaps offset more dramatically by the often
brightly colored sarees and shalwars that non-Muslims often wear.172 During my fieldwork,
black was virtually the only color that women would wear for abaya, though colored sleeves
seemed to be coming into style. I asked my host-sister Wasma why everyone always wore black,
and she replied that black was "fashionable." All of her friends--and, indeed, most of
168
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Kattankudy--wore black abaya with black hijab and niqab. There is also a sense that wearing
simple colors like black marks piety. For example, there was very recently (28.07.2014) an All
Ceylon Jamiyaat Ulema (ACJU) fatwah, "The religious ruling on the wearing of coloured
garments." The following is an excerpt from this ruling:170
Acknowledging and adhering to the above conditions is termed as 'Hijab'. It is not
necessary that the 'Hijab' be of a specific colour or appearance.
Yet many women prefer black coloured garments to coloured ones. The reasons being
that black is simpler, conforms to the aforementioned conditions and is less decorative
(alankaram); whilst these cannot be found so easily in other colours.
There are sufficient evidences that even the Sahaabiyaas (female companions) have worn
black coloured garments as per the authentic Hadeeths quoted in records like Sunan Abi
Dawood.
Even though it is not compulsory for women to wear black coloured garments, it has to
be acknowledged that, such a dress code (which is simpler, less decorative, and confirms
to the religious etiquettes) has been the preferred choice throughout history over other
alternatives. However, there is no harm in choosing colours closely resembling black,
like brown, grey, etc., which is not decorative and less alluring to the non Mahram
opposite sex.
Thus, whereas black is commonly seen as amangalam for Hindus, here black is defended as in
the tradition of the Prophet and his companions.
I have posited above that the oppositional and transnationalized aspects of dress and
ornament such as stark black abayas have some important functions to establish Muslim identity
as distinct. However, in recent years, Buddhist extremist groups such as the Boda Bala Sena see
Muslims as a growing threat to their Buddhist national imaginary have persecuted them even
violently.171 Now, some Muslim groups are seeking to make appeals to soften distinction. The
Muslim Council of Sri Lanka (which is primarily based in the western region) having consulted
the ACJU, is now starting a initiative "Bring your black abayas, we will give you coloured
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abayas."172 New Indian Express quotes Advisor to the All Ceylon Jamiyathul Ulama (ACJU),
Mohammad Dahalan as stating, "The back abaya and the niqab, the face covering which is less
commonly worn, have been creating negative feelings among the majority Sinhalese-Buddhists.
When everybody is in black, it gives the impression that we are a uniformed force. And the niqab
has raised security concerns."173 This not only makes tangible these kinds of perceptions and
notions to differentiate from "others" and "unify" within, but also shows that Muslims to this day
are still negotiating their place in Sri Lanka as racially coherent and distinct, yet still belonging
to Sri Lanka. This has strong echoes of the Azeez-Ramanathan debates where, to re-quote
Thiranagama, Azeez "found himself trying not to emphasize the 'foreignness' of Muslims against
a Sinhala nationalist movement.”174 Thus, many Muslims are caught between distinguishing
their racial and religious 'authenticity' from Tamils by making appeals to the Gulf while
simultaneously negotiating their heritage and home as "Sri Lankan" against Sinhala-Buddhist
chauvinism.
Negotiating Foreign Authenticity in the Local: Moving beyond Transnational 'Influences'
I will broaden the scope of 'ornament' slightly and conclude this section discussing a
different kind of--but equally powerful and embedded in the everyday--ornament: the
presentation of food. With the exception of who eats meats or beef, there aren't very many
significant differences in what people eat in this area. However, the aesthetics of food
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presentation are distinct along communal lines. Moreover, the rumors and stereotypes around
food abound and feed into these distinctions.
In most Tamil homes, it is common for the cook to serve others by herself placing food
onto a plate and giving it out; or, people might come to the kitchen, put food onto their plates,
and return to the dining area. In Muslim homes, it is common for food to be served 'family-style'
in dishes laid out onto a table or on the floor. Then, people sit and take food from this central
location. Particularly on special occasions like Fridays or ifthar ceremonies, the display and the
spread are more dramatic. The drinking water in many Muslim households is particularly
distinctive and adds an ornamental and ceremonial element to eating. While other families often
drink water from individual glasses or from shared water bottles, many Muslims submerge two
tiny cups within a larger glass bowl. This experience is particularly intimate because cups are
then shared and also fingers must dip into the water in order to retrieve the cup. As an outsider, I
admittedly struggled with this custom. Drinking water gracefully and effectively requires a basic
level of knowledge or skill. Initially I was unsure how to grab the cups once submerged--should I
use the fingers I was eating with on my right hand, or should I use my left hand, which is
generally considered to be
dirty? I also was unsure if
I should touch my lips to
the edge of the cup, or if I
should simply pour, like
how people drink from
shared water bottles.
These sorts of debates are
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specific to my own experience, but also to an
extent generalizable to other 'outsiders.' Eating and especially drinking at Muslim functions and
meals requires a distinct and highly embodied ritual. Moreover, it involves an entirely different
aesthetic element to the presentation of the food (See Figure 6).
On one hot afternoon, I ate lunch at an 'Uncle' of mine's home, Abhiman Sir. Abhiman
Sir was a very prominent member of the community known as one of the best English teachers
who formerly had translated for international organizations like the Red Cross. Abhiman Sir was
a very devout and pious Sufi who supports the above mentioned Badhriya Jumma mosque and its
leader 'His Holiness' Abdul Rauf Moulavi. He was always explaining to me the spiritual
meanings and justifications of particular practices and customs, noting that it was the Sufis who
were aware of these sorts of deeper meanings while other Muslims simply performed certain
actions blindly. So, while my other close contact simply told me that these eating customs had
come from the Gulf, Abhiman Sir told me that there was a reason, too, for the ornamental and
communal presentation of drinking cups. He explained that there is no disease that Allah has not
given. So, there is no need to worry about contagious diseases spreading through this intimate
water-drinking practice. Abhiman Sir also pointed out that Tamils will not participate in this
practice, the implication being that caste rules often prevent the sharing of water.
When scholars pay any attention to these sorts of practices, they simply attribute these
practices to global trends of spreading "influence" without paying much attention to the
specificity of how these practices are negotiated in particular localities. Others attribute them to
be signs or effects of "Islamicization," "Arabization," or even occasionally "Wahhabi
influences." For example, Bart Klem writes that Tablighis in Akkaraipattu "shun theological
debate and interpret purification in terms of doing everyday things--eating, praying, dressing and
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so on--in an Islamic way."175 Though more nuanced, McGilvray and Raheem write that, "As in
other countries experiencing Islamic fundamentalism and reform, women's dress has recently
become a public indicator of religiosity."176 All of these notions are problematic and limiting in
different ways. The terms "Islamicization" and "Arabization" are inescapably normalizing as
"Islamic" a particular set of customs from within many other diverse customs, therein etically
asserting an "authentic" origin and geography. Moreover, these conceptions of "influences"
imply an "appropriation" of transnational practices and reforms. This is limiting in that it (1)
plays into notions of cultural wholes rather than dialectics, (2) ignores the specificity of context,
and (3) uncritically takes as a given that such practices are, indeed, "Islamic" and from
"elsewhere."
The case of Kattankudy Muslims' ways of drinking are particularly useful in illuminating
these tensions. Like in the case of jewelry and clothes, many people assume and assert that the
practice of drinking water from a communal glass bowl has come from the Gulf. This is an
important point that highlights a source of authenticity and piety for practitioners. However,
based on (an admittedly very limited) though extensive survey of online photos and video as well
as conversations with colleagues and mentors,177 I have found virtually no basis for this claim.
For example, while the 'family-style' serving may be common in Saudi Arabia, as far as I can tell
there is no sign of drinking water in this particular way. Another explanation for this, then--like
the examples of the nose piercing and the nail polish--is the oppositional nature of this practice
as 'not Tamil.' In light of Abhiman Sir's explanation, this drinking custom is an embodiment of
'Muslimness' by directly speaking against the Tamil Hindu notion of caste. By giving the
specificity of the local its due attention, we can move beyond reductionist notions of
175
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"transnational influences" and "Arabization" to reveal a more complicated, contested, and
negotiated reality.
Concluding Remarks
Thus, this material culture exploration of everyday personal ornaments complicates any
simple notion of transnational "Arabization" or "Islamization" in that the process is, perhaps
necessarily, roughly trigonal. There is a three-way dialectic between local and transnational and
oppositional, such that the embodied reality is necessarily relationally embedded in local idioms.
Moreover, in light of the conceptions and contestations over ancestry--and thus in
authenticity--(touched upon already in Chapter 1), ornaments, clothes, and more generalized
beauty ideals are often an accessible way for women to negotiate and embody, articulate and
assert, these claims. Indeed, it is through beauty that many women are most directly able to
engage with these polemics on-the-ground, even if they act to affirm group expectations. This is
particularly interesting since, given the above discussion, beauty means to at least some extent
embodying otherness. In choosing to embody Saudi trends by wearing ornaments allegedly from
or inspired by Saudi traditions, Muslim women are able to articulate claims to Arab authenticity
in salient local idioms that distinguish them from Tamil 'others.'
Chapter Three: Public Beautification
Mr. Ajmal: In the beginning, we [planted the trees] for the sake of the beautiful style.
But now, people think that [we] are representing their culture.178
Dr. Ameer Ali: I have one observation. When I went to the Eastern Province, in
Kattankudy, they have planted date palms to decorate the roadside. My question was, as
to what Is the connection between date palms and Kattankudy or date palms and Sri
Lanka. Why do you spend millions of rupees to make it look like Arabia? I could see that
already half of the trees had died. I told the Muslims to go to Tissamaharama and see
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what has been planted there: Tamarind trees, which are shady and bearing fruit. Are we
living in this country or are we living in Arabia?179
The Idiom and Term
'Public beautification' refers to projects that ornament explicitly public spaces including
trees, statues, roundabouts, and welcome boards. The term is partially my own construction and
partially gathered from people I spoke with. The term didn't come up as such during interviews
and conversations. However, when I asked people about the trees and statues on the road, they
overwhelmingly described them in a word as for "beauty" and also for "culture." News articles
on Araiyampathy's statues refer to them as such—as silai or uruvassilai (literally "form statue").
Many articles refer to the projects on the whole as "beautification plans,” "for decoration," a
"street beautification plan" or "cultural road decoration statues."183 Similarly in Kattankudy,
news articles describe the date trees as "to beautify."184 My use of the term "public" is not to
suggest that the ornaments in the previous chapter are "private," but rather to emphasize that
these are on government-owned land.
‘Public Beautification’ Literature
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The use of the term "public beautification" in scholarship tends to have particular
connotations of policy-oriented or politician-orientated politics of improvement and progress in
American discourse, and with these in mind I also find it appropriate to use here in both a
general emic and etic sense.185 Literature on 'public beautification' as such is perhaps limited to
studies for improving urban planning, policy, and design.186 Literature on "public art" is more
useful here, and there has been a shift towards public reactions/interactions as a key focus in this
field in the past twenty years. Though this thesis does not aim to provide a comprehensive
literature of "public art," two notable works include Pubic Art: Theory, Practice, and Populism
and the edited volume Public Art in Canada: Critical Perspectives.187
While the works described here perhaps fit in terms of initial production into the fairly
contemporary conception of "public beautification," my analysis tends to treat them more like
material objects, monuments/memorials and, at times, like icons. I thus take the beautification of
spaces very seriously. I see it much like Jamal Elias sees monumental epigraphy. While also
functioning as beautification, it "flourishes in moments of compromised individual or social
authority when there is a heightened need to project a complex set of religious and/or political
messages to an outside group (such as members of another religion or sect) or a competing
political force."188 This understanding of monumental epigraphy is useful for understanding the
public beautification projects here. Elias notes that monumental epigraphy must be understood to
operate polysemically and indexically, and this is how I view public beautification. There are
always multiple layers of meaning not constrained to a particular interpretation, and there are,
185
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therefore, always multiple and simultaneous context-specific meanings. It functions at various
levels as (1) denoted and connoted meanings, (2) as element of a larger ensemble, and (3) as an
inseparable component of the sociopolitical and religious context.189 In Pubic Art: Theory,
Practice, and Populism, Knight builds on the work of James Young and productively
emphasizes the interactions between formal work and public memory as "collected" not
"collective" in the sense of "aggregate in construction, plural in meanings, and mutable in form
and context. This 'collected memory' is comprised of diverse and competing responses...which
shift with time, circumstance, and ideology as they converge at each site.”190 Young writes that
monuments are "forever incomplete" and "fundamentally interactive.”191
In "I nostri grandi Padri...Heroic Nationalism and the Italians of Montreal: The
Monument to Giovanni Caboto, 1935," Anna Maria Carlevaris writes an excellent piece on the
politics of community memory as negotiated through monuments before, during, and after
construction. She situates the monument of Caboto within national political and popular debates
over who first stood on Canadian soil (Cabot or Jacques Cartier) and within transnational Italian
networks and imaginaries. She documents how the Italian consular staff actively participated in
pushing the monument project forward and how this monument embodied a much larger project
of Italian (trans)nationalism and cultural pride. Carlevaris argues that Cabot played a key role in
"a process of collective identity-formation that mythologizes historical origins, the history of the
monument is coloured by ethno-linguistic arguments of the day, debates that were grounded in a
contest for social power and cultural legitimacy."192 She argues that though Cabot's heroic image
189
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and monument mean many things to different people, for Italians in Montreal, his presence
embodied their cultural legitimacy as an Italian figure who had come to the 'New World.'
I argue that the beautification projects examined in this chapter play an insidious role in
similar, as Carlevaris argues, “processes of collective identity-fomation” and “contests for social
power and cultural legitimacy.” I also use the work of James Young and Jamal Elias, recognizing
that despite their material form, these beautification projects are far from constant and exist as
fluid spaces enveloped in collected rumors and informed by layers of socio-political meaning. I
discuss the political motivations and style inspirations, and then I explore the diverse responses
and unintended consequences of these monuments. I highlight their functions to claim lands,
their appeals to (re)make local and transnational histories, and their role in shaping community
imaginaries engaged in polarizing dialectics.
Beginnings and Intentions
Kattankudy
In Kattankudy, while the official body approving these works is technically the collective
body of the Kattankudy Urban Council, the man popularly attributed to these statues is the
prominent Deputy Minister of Economic Development Hizbullah. Some articles note that is was
both through Hizbullah's efforts and a part of Mahinda's "street beautification plan." These
projects are a part "Dawn of the East" component of former president Rajapaksa's "Mahinda
Chintana," or plan for development and propaganda. According to my research associate, A.L.A.
Shibly, Kattankudy's trees and other ornaments were simply "the wish of our minister" and that it
was all a part of his "dream" for Kattankudy that is yet to be realized.193 I was unable to
interview Hizbullah because of his busy schedule coupled with the fact that he lives permanently
in Colombo. However, I conducted multiple in-depth interviews with one of his campaign
193
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advisors of ten years, Mr. Ajmal, along with other politically active men in the town. Mr. Ajmal
told me that what exists now is largely a part of the minister's political scheme to secure popular
public opinion and votes in Kattankudy. He explained that the minister had traveled extensively
abroad, taken photos, and was now trying to create in Kattankudy what he had seen in his travels.
He told me repeatedly that they just wanted to beautify the area, which also would help
Hizbullah maintain his popularity.
The connection between "beautification" and "popular opinion" becomes more striking
when Mr. A. R. Jasif, who works at the Kattankudy Divisional Secretariat, said the project was
supposed to be kavarcci, roughly "attractive" or "sexy." This suggests, literally, intentions of
attracting the public that give greater weight to the denotative and connotative content of the
projects (discussed below) because we may assume that Hizbullah anticipated a particular
response. Shibly Sir and Mr. Ajmal themselves exuded a calculated indifference to these projects
and intermittently would deny any larger meaning and would distance themselves from those
who would attribute such meaning to them. In the interview excerpt at the beginning of Chapter
One, Shibly even claims that they selected particularly date trees for utilitarian ends because
these didn't have leaves that would fall all over the roads.
Araiyampathy
The man directly responsible for the statues in Araiyampathy is Poopalapillai Prasanthan,
a local leader of the TMVP political party. While he and the TMVP party are currently in power,
there is notable division in Araiyampathy with opponents voting for TNA. Like in Kattankudy,
Prasanthan also sought to build a large welcome board on the main road at the northern
boundary. However, people in the area successfully opposed the project. You can still see metal
poles left over from this just behind the first statue (see Figure 12). People I asked gave me one
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of two different—though not necessarily contradictory—explanations. Some people said that the
sign would have blocked access to the local gas station, and others said that TNA members
opposed it as means for blocking political support for TMVP.
Because Prasanthan was unwilling to meet with me, I spoke with a few people in the
office of the Divisional Secretariat. The Secretary confirmed that the statues were the project of a
single local politician—though she wouldn't say particulars—who funded it himself at about
30,000 SLR per statue (this figure is very low and another community member estimates 65,000
SLR).197 They were first put up in 2012. Now, though, the Pradesha Sabha maintains it as a local
public works project. In the interview with the Division's Secretary, I asked "What is the reason
for these statues?"198 She and her clerk, Hari, who was also present, agreed that the statues were
meant to teach about Tamil culture and also for beautification. M.K. Master, a prominent Tamil
elder, added that they were for beauty and were painted gold to add "worth" (allai or aLavu) to
the space.
Median Space
Like the bodily space of nails discussed earlier, other spaces emerge as particularly
salient places to ornament. For public beautification, the most salient space is the median
(piratāṉa vītiyiṉ naṭuvē or piratāṉa vītiyiṉ mattiyil). This space is a very new space, as the roads
were expanded and developed with the help of Japanese aid in 2008. Politicians with an interest
in appealing to particular majorities have in a sense used their political and economic power to
purchase this space and construct community through and in public beautification. The projects
thus play an important role in legitimating political authority and establishing connections to
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authentic cultural identity. However, it is important to emphasize these spaces speak to majority
communities at the expense of what emerges as more complex and diverse populations.
This became especially evident to me when I attended the local St. Mary's Church (along
the main road just across the Arayampathy border) celebration of Stations of the Cross
(Ciluvaippātai). As we, the congregation-onlookers, watched from along the side of the road,
the actors held practiced poses right on the median. There was a two-auto rickshaw-system to
transport the sound system. One auto had the battery and speaker system and the other the mic;
these were connected by some sketchy wires that ran between them. Because of the megaphone
system, no one for quite a large radius had trouble hearing it. The whole procession paused,
moved and repositioned, paused, and moved again in a loop up and back down this main road.
Once we had traveled south far enough to reach the main Araiyampathy Market, the
congregation crossed the road and turned north back towards the church. So, as others went
about their typical morning routines, perhaps buying rotis or stopping by the town market, there
were actor-soldiers violently beating actor-Jesus on the middle of the road. The cracks of the
whips and sticks onto the ground were sharply juxtaposed against the common sounds of
everyday traffic. Many people stopped and watched from the opposite side of the road--Muslims
and Hindus alike.
The median thus became the stage for the reenactment of the Christ's crucifixion. Parts
of the median even were incorporated into the stage as props to support a weakening Jesus. In
addition to the presence of the actors, they would also place a small wooden cross down at each
station to mark the next spot. They had to occasionally weave around the golden statues of
significant Tamil (usually Hindu) figures in the center, and sometimes these would gaze over the
drama scene (See Figure 7). The church members began in Araiyampathy and, notably and
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obviously, they did not go into Kattankudy. As the actors processed down the road, they
ornamented the median with their bodies and legitimized a claim to this salient space for the
Catholic Church.
People use the median space to
highlight other occasions, too. For Eid
(peru naal), lights spiraled up the
trunks of the date trees, and my Aunty
made sure that I had seen them lit
before seeing me off on my journey
back to America. On "May Day," a
labor movement holiday celebrated by
Socialists and Communists on the first
of May, crossed red flags marked the
light posts in Kattankudy as
Araiyampathy's TMVP processed
down the main road. The median
Figure 7, Source: author.

therefore presents a threatre for communities and individual politicians to claim a stake in the
achievements in "progress," to negotiate who development is for, and to (re)emphasize legitimate
claims to identity. These places are also typically important places for traffic.The median of the
road is not the only salient space people chose to ornament. People have in some manner
ornamented other developed, developing, or otherwise significant spaces, too, which merit
further research. There is a statue of Ganesha (Vinayagar or Pillaiyar) along the main road and in
front of the main Araiyampathy market. There was also a Vinayagar statue being reconstructed

May 2015 Final Paper, 2014-2015 Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Fellowship, Penn Humanities Forum
Kimberly Kolor, SAS 2015, University of Pennsylvania

Page 91

near the brand new Palamunai bridge, which is also not coincidentally near disputed settlements
such as Ollikulam, the site of the tsunami resettlement location.199
Kattankudy Beautification Projects
Dates
As mentioned previously, by far, the most iconic and most important features of
1

Kattankudy's public beautification are the fifty to seventy date trees planted on the median of the
main road planted in early 2012 (See Figure 8). 200 Though there are rumors that the trees have
come from Saudi Arabia--even that they had been flown in on planes--Mr. Jasif, who works in
Kattankudy Divisional Secretariat Office, told me that these trees have come from Puttalam,

1

which is on the opposite west coast.201 He did, however, tell me that they planted the trees to
look like Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and sent me a video link with a driving tour so that I could see the
comparison. Potted flowering plants also share the median with the palm trees, but these are
hardly mentioned on the ground or in the news. In addition to the palm trees, there is also a new
speaker system attached to the light posts on the median. These play a beautifully ethereal and
loud adhan, ornamenting the road with sound five times a day. At the Kattankudy entrance,
there are also statues of date trees with gold tops increasing in height up until the large welcome
board. Somewhat ironically, no one seems to mention these as "statues" or find them particularly
problematic.
199
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Figure 8, Source: author.

Figure 9, Source: author.

Roundabouts
Near Kattankudy's southern border with Araiyampathy, there is a small roundabout
(cuṟṟuvaṭṭam) spelling "Allah" from all sides to symbolize that Allah is omnipresent. Its green
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and yellow color scheme was selected presumably to match the mosque on the opposite side of
the street. This is the smallest and least remarkable of the three roundabouts. It is perhaps
reminiscent of the famous Deira Clocktower in Dubai, 202 but there was an exact lookalike with a
19

white color in Karachi, Pakistan that has since been removed. 203 The second roundabout reads
1

"Basmallah" in a stylized Arabic calligraphy (see Figure 9). This roundabout occupies the space
near a major bus stop and is more prominently featured in local news.
The northernmost roundabout is by far the most ornate and enjoys a strategic spot near
the rapidly developing Beach Road, which houses important new mosques, madrasas, and the
homes of wealthy and prominent community members (See Figure 10). It was still undergoing
construction during the time of my fieldwork, but was completed in late November 2014.192 The
roundabout is popularly called "Qur'an Square" (Kur'āṉ catukka) and features a rehal in the
center. When discussing the design with Mr. Jasif, he described it as "Persian" and sent me a link
to Pintrest tab with several miscellaneous "Iranian architecture" designs. This perhaps
underscores a contradiction in the formation of Muslim ethnic identity on the basis of ‘Arab’
blood, when there have been historically mixed ties with a number of different groups including
Persians.194 During a regular workday, a handful of small vendors use this space to sell small
goods like pots, fruits, and curd.
202

“17 of the world’s most beautiful clock towers,” Travel, Telegraph UK, Accessed Nov. 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/11050517/17-of-the-worlds-most-beautiful-clocktowers.html?frame=3014455,
203
Saad Hasan, “As Allah Walli Chowrangi is removed, new road paves over Karachi history,” Tribune, Dec. 17,
2012. http://tribune.com.pk/story/480633/as-allah-walli-chowrangi-is-removed-new-road-paves-over-karachihistory/.
192
“Padangal” Mahinda Rajapaksevin vitiyai azhakupaduththum visheda velaiththiddaththin kizh kaaththaankudy—
Qur’an sutruvaddaththin apiviruththip panikal,” Madawala News, Nov. 29, 2014, http://madawalanews.com/49223;
“Kāttāṉkuṭi – kur'āṉ catukka cuṟṟuvaṭṭattiṉ apiviruttip paṇikaḷ: Piratiyamaiccar hispullāh kēṭṭaṟintu koṇṭār,” Your
Kattankudy.Com\, Nov. 28, 2014, http://yourkattankudy.com/2014/11/28/%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%BE%E0%AE
%A4%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%A4%E0%AE%BE%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%81%E0
%AE%9F%E0%AE%BF-%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%B0%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%86%E0%
AE%A9%E0%AF%8D-%E0%AE%9A%E0%AE%A4/.
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Figure 10, Source: author.
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Araiyampathy Public Beautification
Vivekananda
The first statue that meets visitors entering Araiyampathy's northern boundary is of
Swami Vivekananda (see Figure 12). Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) is an internationallyknown Hindu figure, monk, and disciple of Swami Ramakrishna. He also founded the famous
international Ramakrishna Mission, a spiritual and humanitarian organization that is particularly
active in this area. There is a local chapter in Araiyampathy with a school and cultural center,
and much larger complex just north in Kallady with homes for orphaned girls and boys. I was
also reminded a couple of times throughout the course of my fieldwork that he traveled around
the world and even gave a famous speech in the United States.193 It is perhaps this—this
knowledge that
Vivekananda has a
kind of international
clout—that makes
Swami Vivekananda
the first statute within
Arayampathy. Swami
Vivekananda steps
forward towards the
end of the northern

Figure 12, Source: author.

border and towards Kattankudy.

193

Vivekananda gave hundreds of talks and lectures in the West, but one of his most famous appearances was at the
1893 Parliament of World Religions in Chicago where he represented “India” and “Hindus.” He became a widely
popular figure as a proponent of universality and tolerance with an emphasis on social works; K. Sabaratna,
recorded interview, April 16, 2014. M.K. Master, recorded interview, July 28, 2014
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Vipulananda
Swami Vipulananda (18921947) is the first statue to greet
travelers from the southern boundary of
Araiyampathy village. He is a very
prominent figure in the Batticaloa area
with another statue in the main town.
Vipulananda was born south of this
village in Karativu and has a burial site

Figure 13, Source: author.

in Kallady, about six kilometers north. I was told that he was a very learned man who had
received his education in Batticaloa town, but that he had become disenchanted with life and
traveled to India to become an ascetic. He was known as a Hindu social reformer closely
affiliated with the Ramakrishna Mission and as a Professor of Tamil in both India and Sri Lanka.
He is the namesake for buildings and organizations throughout the area, including Eastern
University's Swami Vipulananda School of Aesthetic Studies in Kallady.
Soldier
There wasn't much consensus on this figure (See Figure 13), but I would maintain that its
menacing stance and identity as a traditional kind of warrior are perhaps most important. This
statue is located near the Araiyampathy Hospital, which was formerly called the "Kattankudy
Hospital." "Arayampathy.com" describes this figure was Mahaveeran Pandara Vanniyan, who
was the last Tamil King of Vanni (d.1803) and known for fighting the British.195 On the other

195

“Araya Vanniyan,” Arayampathy News, accessed on March, 2015,
http://www.arayampathy.com/uploads/araya%20vanniyan.jpg; S. Makenthiran, “Tamils in Independent Ceylon,”
Ilankai Tmail Sangam: Association of Ta mils of Sri Lanka in the USA, Nov. 2004, Accessed Feb. 2015,
http://www.sangam.org/articles/view2/?uid=675 .
Figure 12, Source: author.
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hand, M.K. Master told me very confidently that this was Kattabomman, a Tamil Nadu figure
famous for fighting against the British in the late 18th century. He also told me that Kattabomman
fought the Mughal Muslims, which has implications given the current tension over the
boundaries.196 This statue appears to have the details common to depictions of Pandara
Vanniyan as opposed to Kattabomman, though both share similar features. Furthermore, there
are reports of a Pandara Vanniyan statue constructed recently in Jaffna, which suggests the
figure’s popularity amongst Tamils even in the North.197 Even as a generalized-traditionalwarrior-type, this would have significance for a town that traces its origins to river soldiers of the
Cera, Chola, and Pandya dynasties. Indeed the cover of The Soil of Araiyampathy features two
such river soldiers that are very much reminiscent of this
statue. These figures were copied and pasted from internet
photos of still another figure, the Tamil Nadu warrior
Ondiveeran (d.1800).198
Culture Girl
Like the previous statue, this one, too is the source of
some dispute (see Figure 14). K. Sabaratna told me this
figure was Mari Amman and another woman told me it was
Figure 14, Source: author.
196

Kattabomman was dramatized as ‘freedom fighter’ in a widely popular Tamil film with superstar Sivaji
Ganeshan, who erected statues of him and creataed him as a kind of universal Tamil hero. However, accounts I
have checked thus do not indicate any connection to the Mughals. See M.S.S. Pandian, “Culture and Subaltern
Consciousness: An Aspect of MGR Phenomenon” Economic and Political Weekly 24, no. 30 (1989):65. See also
Anthony Good, “Maamul’ and Modernity in a South Indian Temple,” Modern Asian Studies 35, no 4 (2001): 863;
Anand A. Yang, “Bandits and Kings: Moral Authority and Resistance in Early Colonial India,” The Journal of Asian
Studies 66, no 4 (2007): 881-896.
197
“Great Warrior Pandaveeran Memorial Day,” Battiwin: The News Corporation, Aug. 26, 2013. Accessed Mar.
2015, http://battiwin.com/news.php?id=2604#sthash.0JySeh23.WF2ZE0we.dpbs.
198
No one mentioned Ondiveeran in my fieldwork; rather, I was able to see based on the cover art a small label.
Both of these images come up immediately under a google search of “Ondiveeran.” It is plausible that the illustrator
has a particular image of a warrior in mind, and felt that Ondiveeran fit the expectations of the mental image.
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Kanagi Amman, who are both mother goddesses though with divergent dispositions. However,
when discussing a photo of this statue with M.K. Master and his daughter, there was some debate
before M.K. Master said, "that is just a culture girl."199
Bharathiyar
Subaramania Bharatiyar (1882-1921) is
considered to be one of the greatest Tamil poets and
was given the title of Maha Kavya with the support
of Vipulananda (see Figure 15). Bharatiyar, too, was
famous for resisting the British and was a key
nationalistic figure in the independence movement.
Ulakanatchi

Figure 15, Source: author.

This statue is near the divisional secretariat (see Figure 16). As mentioned above, Ulaka
Natchi ("World Ruler") plays a preeminent role in depictions of Araiyampathy's grand past. She
was from the Kalinga Dynasty and came with her brother, Ulaka Nathan, to rule in the 3rd or 4th
century A.D. According to accounts citing the text Maddakkalappu Maanmiyam, the Sinhala
king Gunasingan granted her the lands near what is today Manmunai. Ulaka Natchi brought
with her a Siva lingam and established a special and grand temple at Kokkaddicholai,200 across
the lagoon and west of Manmunai.201 One article sites this statue as particularly significant
because a great number of people in Batticaloa are the descendants of Ulaka Natchi.202

199

“Athu summa oru kalaachaaram pombale,” M.K. Master, recorded interview, July 28, 2014
Navam Teacher, “History,” Arayampathy News, accessed August, 2014,
http://www.arayampathy.com/history.php; K. Sabaratna, The Soil of Arayampathy; Mr. Tambimuttu, recorded
interview with author, April 16, 2014.
201
The farms around this temple are yet another example of disputed territory today. Muslim landlords, or podiyars,
were forced to flee during the years of the war as this area was uncleared and under LTTE control. There has since
been dispute as to who owns these paddy fields.
202
“After the breaking of Araiyampathy statue, people want to know who [is responsible],” BattiNews.Com, Oct. 8,
2013. Accessed Oct. 014, http://www.battinews.com/2013/10/blog-post_7033.html
200
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Figure 16, Source: author.

Thiruvalluvar
Thiruvalluvar is an extremely famous and widely celebrated 3rd-1st century Tamil poet.
He authored the Thirukkural, which consists of a series of philosophical couplets on a variety of
subjects form friendship to state-building. The Thirukkural is very frequently a standard part of
school curriculum.
Transnational Appeals
Though it should be readily apparent considering the previous discussion of these
projects, it is important to highlight that an extremely significant aspect of constructing and
validating the authenticity of community culture are the transnational appeals made in these
idioms. Thus, the idiom of public beautification exists as a constant space to appeal to and
embody transnational agency for authenticity. These appeals are actively constructed in this local
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context to legitimize claims to particular heritages and pasts by appealing to real or imagined
connections to foreign powers. This is important in light of globalizing capitalist markets and
the real and rumored transnational networks of aid mentioned in Chapter One.
Kattankudy town envisions itself as being a distinct node within a larger global umma not
only doctrinally and culturally, but also economically. Recently, the town had all road signs also
written in Arabic so that visitors who might come would be able to read them.203 On one
occasion, a shop owner even explained that the reason they put the public beautification was so
people visiting would find it beautiful. Thus, public beautification performs an important role in
the advertising and cultivating of real current and future transnational economic and aid-based
ties. This ostentatious display feeds community imaginaries as well-connected to the Middle
East. In light of the migrant traffic between the Gulf nations and Kattankudy people as well as
increased avenues of trade and multi-national corporations, these public beautification projects
also serve a related and more practical function to cater to a new international audience. The
large welcome board at the northern border also potentially indicates an increasing shift in
orientation. The old entrance board pre-Japanese road 2008welcomes visitors to "Kattankudy" in
four languages: Tamil, Sinhala, English, and Arabic. The new, sleek entrance gate welcomes
visitors in the same four languages, this time to "Batticaloa."204 The change from the town name
to the district name could indicate a shift in target audience--from that of a local viewer with
more exact knowledge of place to that of a more international viewer less attuned to the
specificity of local places.
203

However, complaints were filed (according to Mr. Ajmal, by Tamil politicians) and the road signs were removed
on the grounds that Arabic was not an official language of Sri Lanka. Name boards in Tamil saying “Vannakkam,
Batticaloa Welcomes You” were also destroyed and rumors abounded as to why. Some rumors stated that it was
Muslims who find “Vannakkam” to be haram, while other sources in Kattankudy claim that it was the Sri Lankan
Government who is engineering rumors to divide Tamils and Muslims; Mr. Ajmal, recorded interview, May 24,
2014; “Tamil name boards removed along Batticaloa-Kalmunai Road,” TamilNet, Sept. 23, 2011. Accessed Apr.
2015, http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=34450.
204
Hasbullah and Korf, “Muslim geographies,” 33.
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While Kattankudy has been criticized by some for its ostentatious appeals to 'Arab'
aesthetic, few people consider that Araiyampathy's and the Batticaloa's (about 7 kilometers
north) make similar appeals to India. Many of Araiyampathy's statues make direct appeals and
references to Indian heritage that are less contested than those of Kattankudy. One man I spoke
with even told me that the sculptor had come from India. In Batticaloa town there is another
figure of Thiruvalluvar and perhaps more interestingly, a statue of Gandhi. Gandhi is perhaps a
very peculiar statue for this area as his connections to Sri Lanka are less obvious (though he did
visit the country in 1927), which could suggest that his statue is not so much intended to signify
an existing connection so much as it is to negotiate present and future ones. He remains not
wholly uncontested. In April 2012, the statue was destroyed. While I discuss statue destruction
more below, it is important to mention here that this incidence represents a case where the
transnational appeal actually reached the target nation and incited action. Indian Diplomats and
the Indian High Commission made public statements and requested "urgent investigations" of the
incident205 Thus in this case, while much is made of an "invasion" of Middle Eastern culture, it is
actually the case that the Tamil Hindu community also makes similar appeals to India (though on
arguably more reasonable claims to ancestry).
Creating Oppositional Beauty: The Dialectic of Ornamented Land
Furthermore, focusing on how public beautification is used as a technology of
community that operates within local idioms also significantly tells us what the community is
not. This is why Kattankudy's public beautification has come under fire: They are self-alienating-polarizing, even. And that is in many ways the point. As mentioned above when discussing
Basimah's reaction to my nose piercing, what it means to be "Muslim" in this town is in many
205

R. K. Radhakrishnan. “Statue of Gandhi defaced in Sri Lanka,” The Hindu. April 8, 2012,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/statue-of-gandhi-defaced-in-sri-lanka/article3291303.ece..
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ways determined as "not being Tamil." When considering the history of Muslim identity
discussed in Chapter One, I argue that it is particularly significant that Hizbullah chose to, as Mr.
Ajmal described, take photos and build here what he has seen abroad. On a very simple but
powerful level, Tamil Hindus and Christians in this area simply do not relate to these
beautification projects, particularly the roundabouts and prominent mosques. I argue that public
beautification powerfully embodies this argument: most of the Tamil residents of Araiyampathy
that I spoke with buy into this rhetoric. When asking about either Kattankudy's or
Araiyampathy's public beautification, people often described one town in terms of the other. For
example, a friend of mine told me, "The [Araiyampathy] statues are our culture people, they
reflect our culture. You can see especially in Kattankudy they are putting at the border trees it's
like their culture, that's why they are putting these to reflect our culture.206" In one of my
interviews, Mr. Ajmal--evidently exasperated by my repeated questions about Kattankudy's
trees--told me defensively that Kattankudy has date trees but other communities have other trees.
For example, he pointed out that Tamil Hindus value other trees like neem and aracu maram.
This further underscores the relational and oppositional aspect to local discourse on the projects.
Similarly, some prominent Tamil community members I spoke with noted (evidently as
an advantage) that the statues in Araiyampathy would not be appealing to Muslims. One woman,
Daarshana, told me matter-of-factly that they chose statues because "For [Muslims] there is a
fear of shape/form [uruvam] no?"207 K. Sabaratna commented that they selected Swami
Vivekananda at the border precisely because (in his view) Muslims would find it distasteful or
even harmful. Significantly, the oppositional aspect of public beautification also has political
implications in the sense that it contributes to Kattankudy's visible development vis a vis
206
207

My. Ajmal, recorded interview, June 29, 2014.
“avungalukku uruvam bayamthaanE.” M.K. Master, recorded interview, July 28, 2014.
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Araiyampathy, and goes on to suggest that this development is for a particular community. It
also contributes to the ethnicization of the district governments discussed in Chapter One by
marking government land with the beauty and cultural appeals specific to a particular
community.
Making Authentic Claims to Lands
This brings us to an even more contested function of public beautification: claiming
lands. In this function, public beautification participates in a wider material and socio-spatially
oriented community that negotiates and contests boundaries, along with new and old temples and
mosques, in constituting and contesting lived and official borders between these towns. This is
particularly important given the land disputes festering before and aggravated by the war (see
Chapter One). In my interviews with prominent Tamil community members, this function of
public beautification and temples was immediately and openly acknowledged. As noted
previously, Araiyampathy's northern boundary has been creeping south for several decades.
Because of "Muslim encroachments" at this boundary, the main road itself has become a key
point of contestation. There--on the median--Swami Vivekananda steps forward towards
Kattankudy as Araiyampathy's defender against Kattankudy's ominous 'Saudi' trees. The
following interview excerpt with K. Sabaratna is revealing:
Me: Why did they put [the statues] there?
K. Sabaratna: Because of this Muslim--uh what we call that....they are capturing our
land. They are ruined so many ...encroachments...
Me: So if you keep that there...
K. Sabaratna: --because they can't come back. Because of that we have put that man
there. [laughs]208
Me: So are there other statues like that?
K. Sabaratna: No, no. Not like that. He is a sacred man no? So they won't have courage
to even after this.
208

K. Sabaratna, recorded interview with author, Apr. 16, 2014.
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And he makes a valid point: to some extent the physical existence of a statue prevents
people from going there and physically marks the space as Tamil. The median stretches to about
the southern border of Araiyampathy, where it becomes an undivided road. There, the final two
statues of Thiruvalluvar and Swami Vipulananda are reoriented to face south towards the town's
other border.
Another highly contested space is the settlement Karbala, named after the famous 7th
century battle and site of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in modern-day Iraq, at Araiyampathy's
northeast seashore border with the Bay of Bengal. The Sufi All Ceylon Thareekathul Mufliheen
has built a meditation center there that also holds the tomb of their founder, 'Payilvan.'209 In local
perspective, this group occupies a liminal space both socio-religiously and spatially. This group
is by most accounts marginalized and ostracized from greater Kattankudy society and was the
victim of the widespread anti-Sufi violence in 2007 mentioned earlier. Araiyampathy residents,
too, find this group to be an encroaching threat to their lands. Despite the fact that Thareekathul
Mufliheen is officially in the Manmunai Pattu Division, most Araiyampathy residents view this
area as "captured" by the Muslims and by extension Kattankudy town. To defend the border
from further encroachment, on February 27, 2014,210 District officials and politicians (with
Prasanthan, of course, being most prominent) installed a fierce Siva statue on the beach in this
area, gazing out over the ocean as Siva typically faces East.211 My interview with M.K. Master
and his daughter, Darshana, reveal that people share similar sentiments about the function of this
statue in relation to those on the road:

209

See their website “Mufliheen.org,” http://www.mufliheen.org.
Suresh, “A 21 Sivan Statue at Araiyampathy Beach,” Battinewsfirst, Accessed Jan, 2015,
http://www.battinewsfirst.com/2014/02/21.html.
211
Charles Dillard Collins, The Iconography and Ritual of Siva at Elephanta. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 24.
210
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Me: So, why have they just kept the statue there?
Darshana: That, so the people that go--there is the sea shore no? For the sake of going
for the 'hobby time.' And bakthi [devotion] will come. Additionally, for safety, that's all
Muslims there, no? For them there is a fear of shape/form [uruvam] no? For the sake of
that.
One article even refers to this statue as a "Boundary Sivan" (ellaissivan).212 This statue
has some color detail on the face but is still in the
conventional gold color like the ones on the main road
(see Figure 17).213 However, at twenty-one feet, this
statue is much taller than the others ornamenting the
median. News articles refer to this particular statue with
the prefix "thiru" for additional respect, becoming
"thiruvuruvassilai," contrasted to "uruvassilai." The statue
depicts Siva as Nataraj (Dancer) performing a Rudra
Tandava, which is done in a violent mood and is the
dance of destruction or death.214
Figure 17, Source: author.

This function does not apply only to public beautification. M.K. Master and Darshana
also implicate the construction of temples themselves as defenders of Araiyampathy's borders.
Near the Sivan statue is a Narasimha (Tamil: Narasingam) Temple built within the past ten
years, also for the very purpose of securing Araiyampathy's Northeast border from 'Muslim
encroachments.' M.K. Master and his daughter laughed as they told me that temple was also for

212

“The opeaning of a 21 foot state at Batticaloa Araiyampathy border,” KuruNews:Batticaloa. Accessed March,
2015, http://www.kurunews.com/2014/02/21.html.
213
This statue was designed by a “Ruben,” who seems to be a prominent figure in the trade.
http://www.battinewsfirst.com/2014/02/21.html.
214
Namita Gokhale , The Book of Shiva, (Penguin Global, 2003), 29.
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"border security."215 This temple is now used to justify and claim the lands as rightfully Tamil in
light of local land disputes as Muslims after the war seek to return to their land.216
Another "security" temple guards the opposite northwest corner of Araiyampathy near the
lagoon side where I lived. The Sri Paramanayanar Temple is much older--allegedly over 300
years old—and in an area that has been long-settled and not contested. 217 Nonetheless, this
temple, too, can be seen as a guard of Araiyampathy's borders. M.K. Master told me it was also
"for safety and security—like a bodyguard."218 (Again, though perhaps he didn't intend it to be
so, the use of the term 'bodyguard' reinforces these technologies as a constructing bodies.)
Ayyanar temples are common Tamil village border guardians, and it is common for villages to
have these kinds of temples guarding the peripheries.219
Kattankudy's public beautification, too, negotiates its boundaries. Mr. Ajmal commented
that before, when the LTTE still had sway in the area, people in Kattankudy were afraid to
demarcate boundaries. When they were able to build the welcome board archway, they placed it
inside the actual political border of the town, which has led to confusion as to where the northern
boundary begins. He lamented that actually the border is much farther north, but now people
assume the boundary begins where the large archway is built.
Kattankudy's mosques also function on this basic level to claim land and legitimate the
Muslim communities in those areas. A few key Tamil informants that I spoke exclaimed how
unnecessary it was to have so many mosques. While mosques being built in Manmunai Pattu
attract particular attention from the Tamil community, there are also interesting new mosques
215

MK. Master and daughter, recorded interview, July 28, 2014.
Tambimuttu, “Araiyampathi pithesathil aththumeeri kaanikalai pidiththavarkalai janaathipathi peci veliyetruven.”
Arayampathy.com News
217
Temple Trust President, recorded interview, July 22, 2014.
218
M.K. Master, recorded interview, July 28, 2014.
219
Diane Mines, Fierce Gods: Inequality, Ritual, and the Politics of Dignity in a South Indian Village,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 131.
216
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being built within Kattankudy's borders including one modeled after Dome of the Rock and
another prominent mosque and madrasa allegedly funded by Middle Eastern countries like Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait.
Additionally, it is important to mention here--in light of the above discussion of the role
of the Payilvan Meditation Center and Araiyampathy temples in working with public
beautification to negotiate space--that such Sufi groups must also negotiate their own place
within Kattankudy's borders--through and between the beautification projects on the main road.
Hasbullah and Korf (2012) argue that it was only by taking advantage of the ethnicized divisions
and locating their center just outside of Kattankudy that Payilvan's followers were able to
institutionalize and practice their faith in the first place.220
Though located within the boundaries of Kattankudy and not located on a political
boundary, I argue that Badhriya Jumma Mosque also negotiates a similar liminal space. This
community's leader, Rauf Moulavi, is constantly warning his followers of the "Wahhabis" in
Kattankudy while defending his teaching and Badhriya Mosque as the true and straight path. He
frames many of his teachings in this polemic, and he defends Badhriya essentially as an island of
the true Sunnat Wal Jamaat in a sea of Wahhabis. Indeed, in a booklet titled "'Waseela' related to
foreign 'Fatwa's" distributed at the 2014 Grand Khwajajee Feast, Rauf Moulavi appeals to his
supporters with the following message:221
The mosque we see above was established in 1960 by the followers of Jawad Al-Haj
Abdul Alim Arif Billah Awliya Kamil (Rah). After that, his son Al-Haj Arif Fillaah
Abdul Rauf Misbahee Thala Umruhee and those accompanying him have not changed
that Badhriya Jumma Mosque and Madrasa. In this mosque the Sunnat Wal Jamaat policy
and works are observed in the manner of Badr(?) Sahaba's monuments. Here people
come day after day mobilize/flock/rely and come (to)the gone/past/dead God/Truth220

Hasbullah and Korf, “Muslim geographies,” 38.
This was the 28th Annual Khwajajee Grand Feast in honor of Hazrath Khwaja Muyeenudhdheen Chisthee (Rali)
and Hazrath Khwaja Fakhrudhdheen Chisthee (Rali). On the ground people referred to this is a kanthoori.
221
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loving saints in the way of the Sufi tarigah. In Sri Lanka, this mosque becomes the only
and unique place of God (in which) people in the path of Sunnat Wal Jamaat Sufi tarigah
are called and go in the path of Allah. So, to finish building the huge mosque you see,
given the huge amount that will be needed, we kindly ask that you wisely do
funding/donate in/from the wealth Allah provided you, having switched the obtaining of
wealth in this world for in the Paradise Hereafter.222 [emphasis added]
In this passage, Rauf Moulavi cites importance of this mosque as a space for the 'true'
way, or as many people told me, the "straight way," of the Sufi tarigah. The mosque becomes not
only an important claim to the true Path, but also--given the previous violent attemptes to
"purify" Kattankudy's borders--important in defending and maintaining the right to the land and
space within Kattankudy and within Sri Lanka at large. He also defends the decoration of this
mosque and its ziaram, adamantly claiming that festival decorations (alaṅkāram) are the symbols
(ciṉṉaṅkaḷ) of Allah and the identity (aṭaiyāḷam) of Muslims.223 This community deserves much
more close attention that is, alas, outside of the scope of this thesis. However, this brief
discussion of Badhriya's giant mosque--together with the other mosques, temples, and public
222
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beautification projects--illustrates that, simultaneous with and defined by claims territory, each
"monument" becomes "a point of reference amid other parts of the landscape, one node among
others in a topographical matrix that orients the rememberer and creates meaning in both the land
and our recollections.224" These modalities are thus worth considering alongside public
beautification.
Iconoclasms
The meanings, perceptions, and purposes of public beautification are thus clearly
contested in symbolic and tangible ways. This manifests most dramatically in what I am loosely
calling here "iconoclasm." I refer to it as such in part because iconoclasm exists in many forms
today, and in part because these projects, as instrumental ornaments of ethnicized lands, have in
many ways become icons. At and near my field site, there were three instances of statue
destruction within the past three years: two statues in Araiyampathy and one in the main
Batticaloa town. These cases are interesting because, unlike in the popularly discussed instances
of iconoclasm in South Asia, the actual perpetrators remain largely unknown, anonymous or
largely insignificant as individual actors. However, this anonymity permits rumors to flourish;
and these rumors and reactions in turn--as we have seen throughout this thesis--shape
understandings of icon, iconoclast, and, indeed, community.
I had first heard about the statue destruction when asking Mr. Ajmal if there were any
popular stories about these statues, and he told me half-jokingly that Araiyampathy's
Vivekananda statue had lost its nose. A few other people I asked about it seemed less than
interested and also downplayed the incident. Nonetheless, after this incident, army personnel
came and enforced a curfew in anticipation of possible violence.225 The Tamil politician
224
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Prasanthan blamed Muslims for the destruction. He paid for a replacement and held a formal reinstallation ceremony with Muslim politicians from Kattankudy present. Thus, these statues
have a powerful impact negotiating local politics and can, at particular moments, function as
charged icons of communal identity. Jamal Elias discusses "icon" as a "heuristic concept that
delineates the distinction between supposedly 'good' and 'bad' images, the latter being referred to
derogatorily as "idols.226" He writes that "One of the most enduring uses of the concept of
idolatry lies in imagining a cultural other as distinct from oneself, a process that is
simultaneously exoticizing in romantic or wondrous
senses and a means of arguing for one's own
religious and cultural superiority.”227 With this
dialectic understanding of idol and icon, I argue
that in these intensified moments of "iconoclasm"
that have consolidated to the public beautification's
function as community icon.
The first statue destroyed was the Swami
Vivekananda statue in Araiyampathy January 9,
2012 by a "motorbike squad" late at night.228 The
statue suffered damage to the nose and hands (see
Figure 18). Though one man from Kattankudy was
Figure 18, Source: author.

jailed and then released on bail, on the ground everyone reported that the culprits have yet to be
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caught. Nonetheless, rumors abound. While it is likely that we will never know who is
responsible for this act, the rumors are very useful to help unpack perceptions of communal
tension as well as perspectives on how these statues participate in this tension. For example, my
Aunty (in Kattankudy) explained to me that there were political tensions amongst the two main
Tamil political parties (TMVP and TNA) and that the opposing party had destroyed the statue.
K. Sabaratnam told me that it was Muslims who destroyed the statue, pointing out that America
also was fighting "those buggers." My Sufi contact, Abhiman Sir, told me that it was Wahhabi
"bigots" because they feared that people would start praying to it because it was at the
boundary.229 One Kattankudy Urban Council member even told me that it was the work of
Sinhalese government secret forces who were trying to exacerbate tensions between Muslims
and Tamils. These diverse accounts reveal diverse imaginings of community and understandings
of politics that are largely mobilized in rumors.
The Batticaloa Gandhi statue mentioned earlier was destroyed on April 5, 2012. This was
one of four statues vandalized in Batticaloa town at the time, and reports suggest that the height
of some of the statues indicated that multiple people were involved. This particular incident
received more press because, as a testament to the agency of the transnational appeals mentioned
above, high-ranking Indian officials took an interest in the issue. For example, The Hindu
reported on the "desecration," saying that the Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka "requested
urgent investigation" and took up the issue with Sri Lanka's Foreign Secretary, the Chief
Minister of the Eastern Province, and the Inspector General of Police.230 However, the few
people I spoke with about this particular incident all suggested that it was, in fact, the police
themselves who were responsible for this incident. Even as a 'mere' rumor, the implications of
229
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this allegation are telling for community-State relations; indeed, they perhaps subtly redefine
these relations.
The final instance of statue destruction that I encountered was the case of Araiyampathy's
Ulaka Natchi statue in the middle of the night on September 23rd, 2013. Unlike in the previous
cases, two men were actually caught in the act and arrested. The two men were apparently
"Muslims from Oddamavadi," a town 40 kilometers north of Araiayampathy. Based on my
discussions with community members, reactions to this incident were mixed. Officials in the
Araiyampathy Divisional Secretariat office played down the incident, K. Sabaratna felt
frustration that Hisbullah had "covered the incident up nicely," other friends seemed to address
the issue matter-of-factly, and my contact in the Kattankudy Urban Council again told me that
the (Sinhalese) government is trying to instigate tensions. One local article goes so far as to say
that this statue destruction cannot be seen as normal but rather could be seen as an attack on an
entire people.231 The article continues on to suggest the possibility of this act as a premeditated
plan to divide the Tamil and Muslim people.
These acts therefore come to be seen as 'iconoclastic' attacks on the conventions of a
town and even its people. While few, if any, know the perpetrator's real motivations behind these
acts, the reactions to them have transformed the works themselves and, to at least some extent,
shaped self-understanding of community. Regardless of one's suspicions and interest in the
matter, iconoclastic acts force people to confront the fact that these public beautification works
231
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mediate disputes at different registers. Through their desecration, they become, as Finbar Flood
has put it, synechdoches.232 Regardless of who thinks who did what, people view--with more or
less concern—the destruction of a statue as a defamatory act against what the statue represents (a
single politician-patron, a political party, and/or a larger religious or ethnic community). Thus,
these statues have become 'iconic' in the sense that they embody more than their material
suggests in and of itself. Interestingly, some residents of Kattankudy find the trees to be too
similar to the statues as both "icons" and "idols" of the Muslim imaginary and thus reject them as
such. These people (like Mr. Ajmal and Shibly Sir) are paradoxically forced to compare these
projects with their 'idolatrous' Hindu neighbors while simultaneously maintaining the superiority
of their projects as 'merely' beautiful and not religious or cultural. These iconoclastic acts draw
greater attention to these works as icons and more deeply entrenches them as conventions of
community imaginaries.233 And they negotiate politics such that they are neither 'neutral' nor
'merely' beautiful.
(Re)installation
The attacks on Araiyampathy's statues can be viewed at different levels, most obviously:
(1) as against Prasanthan's efforts specifically, and/or (2) his political party (TMVP), and/or (3)
as against the Tamil Hindu that he caters to more generally. Prasanthan took full advantage of
the destruction of Swami Vivekananda to hold a grand ceremony to reinstate a new statue and
reassert both his political hegemony and that of the larger TMVP/Tamil Hindu community. He
hosted a sizable re-installation function to which a number of important politicians and
community members from both Araiyampathy and Kattankudy were obliged to attend. In
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addition to these prominent community members, school children also participated in the
procession and event.
The function itself has very interesting implications for what this statue--and by
extension, the collection of Arayampathy's statues—means as a technology of community. They
processed the new statue in the bed of a truck from the large Murugan Temple, one of the most
prominent temples in Araiyampathy, to the statue's former location at the border. Photos depict a
pujari performing a type of abishekam ritual as well as many people (including Muslim
community members) partaking in garlanding the statue, which is a common sign of respect in
South Asia typically reserved for deities, politicians, and honored guests.234 The Secretary in
Araiyampathy's Division Secretariat Office told me that "Muslim religious people" came to this
function to ensure that it will not be broken again.235 The statue had therefore been reconsecrated with increased significance and authority with the (at least official) validation of the
"other" community. My contact in the Kattankudy Urban Council was among the attendees. He
downplayed the event, adding that everything went smoothly and that there was not a single
problem.
For the installation of the Sivan statue on the beach, Prasanthan and other community
leaders from the Manmunai Pattu District office and local temples held a large puja and
ceremony. They processed the statue from Sri Veeramma Kali Amman Temple, along the main
road and inner roads, and finally to the spot on the beach in the contested land. There, a crane
lifted the statue onto a cement platform. Again, the presence of so many important people from
the Manmunai Pattu District office sends a clear signal that this project had the support of the
local government. Moreover, the rituals performed by pujaris and, indeed, the ceremony and
234
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procession as a whole, consecrate the statue into its community function as "Boundary Siva"
socially, politically, and religiously. It also continues to reaffirm this as a Tamil Hindu act, a
Tamil Hindu community project, and—most importantly, Tamil Hindu land.
Date Harvest
While Hizbullah has not had the misfortune—or opportunity—to hold an event
reinstating destroyed public works, he does, however, make a very public performance of date
harvesting each year. He holds and presides over an annual ceremony to initiate the harvest,
which is then carried out by the Kattankudy Urban Council.236 There are even photos of
community members kissing the dates at this function.237 He uses this occasion as an
opportunity to reconnect and contribute to a town that he no longer lives in, and ultimately as a
political move to gain popular support. Some people dismissively perceive this event and the
date tree beautification projects to be just that: 'frivolous' political tactics. (Indeed, some
sarcastically see Hizbullah's main role as that of 'public beautifier.')
However, many others also see this as an important event for the Muslim community in
Kattankudy and in Sri Lanka at large. News of Kattankudy's annually increasing date harvest
spreads through Tamil language blogs and media outlets throughout the island such as Srilanka
Muslims, Jaffna Muslim, Virakesari, and Thinakaran.238 One article states that the dates are of
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"historic importance" for Muslims in Kattankudy.239 Another site's headline reads "These are the
dates ripened in our country!"240 These statements negotiate these trees not as projects of
political community, but as a testament to a thriving Muslim community. Abhiman Sir once told
me that he stopped and picked up some dates that had fallen on the road while walking to my
Aunty's home. He said that normally dates wouldn't be able to ripen in this weather, but people
say that Allah has made Kattankudy hotter (from about 33 degrees Celsius to 37) in order to
ripen them here. Anticipating possible skepticism on my part, he pointed out that it was possible.
Allah could do anything that he willed, and in the Qur'an he promises to provide food for his
people. While some people I mentioned this to laughed and brushed the story aside ("some
people will think that! It is not like that!"), some news pages allude to this same understanding.
For example, Thainaadu says "In Kattankudy it is currently very hot. The date palms have
bloomed and the climate is more conducive to ripening.241"
Technologies of Cultural Authenticity
These ritualized ceremonies--whether they be statue-installations or date-harvests-highlight that public beautification starts to emerge as what I have argued throughout this chapter
as an important technology for negotiating cultural authenticity. In Araiyampathy, the statues
function primarily for these purposes. They visually recreate the long and proud history of the
town and literally root this history into the soil. The statues celebrate important figures with
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local, national, transnational, and Tamil cultural significance and in their selection negotiate
local conceptions of local Tamil history. A local elementary school principal pointed out that
children would see the cultural and learn about the culture.242 My host Akka, Raji, described the
statues to me as collectively "Hindu Saivite," saying that those statues represented the founders
of Tamil culture.243 In Araiyampathy, it is often explicitly acknowledged that the public
beautification projects are not only for beauty, but also for "culture" and "history"—and keeping
the Muslims from "encroaching." In light of the ongoing land disputes, public beautification
presents a salient way for community leaders to articulate "authentic" claims to land by
negotiating and remaking their history—literally making it a tangible participant in the present
and rooting the past in contemporary soil.
In Kattankudy, too, people generally and tacitly assume that these public beautification
projects are a part of the culture. Mr. Ajmal acknowledges that, "In the beginning, we did it like
that for the sake of the beautiful 'style,' but other people didn't know the culture and said it was
Saudi or something like that. But it is not more than that."244 He added that people thought
Hizbullah was representing their culture and "that he is putting all these things here from Dubai,
so he is looking after us." While he clearly was dismissive of this idea, he himself recognizes this
inevitable function. In another interview, he contradicted these statements and (as mentioned in
the opening of Ch.1) says, "We [planted the trees] to make the town seem more worthy (aḷavu).
That, and also we cannot keep [things from] another culture here. We may keep [only things
from] this one culture here.”245 It is important to reiterate the distancing act that people like
Shibly Sir employ in dismissing these as "merely" beautification or political projects. In its
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blatant material mediation and ostensible "frivolity," it is perhaps not a proper "Islamic" practice
in their eyes. Yet, people continue to make the connection consciously and subconsciously that
Kattankudy's public beautification projects are "Muslim," if for no other reason than the obvious
denotative and connotative content described above. For example, one man explained that dates
were significant because Muslims are supposed to break the Ramzan fast with dates in the
tradition of the Prophet. He also acknowledged that these trees were beautification, underscoring
the very act of "beautification" as a polysemic technology of community. Even Shibly Sir
contradicted himself and implicated the piety of the date trees when he contrasted Hizbullah's
lack of beard with the fact that he has planted the trees.
Of immense importance, too, is that these beautification projects are seen as making
Kattankudy more like Saudi Arabia. As noted in the previous chapter, these appeals are made in
part in a spirit of religious revival and transformation. Kattankudy's Gulf-esque urban design is
not only a statement of the present culture in an aspirational sense, but also ultimately a
(re)articulation--or perhaps (re)fashioning--of Kattankudy's past. There is a very strong
correlation between the narrative origin stories discussed in Chapter One and the visual/material
constructions of authenticity negotiated in these public beautification projects--in conjunction
with the personal adornments discussed in the previous section. The visible and public nature of
Kattankudy's beautification projects, considered along with the salience of the idiom in general,
has in many ways profoundly negotiated what Azeez had attempted. As the Manmunai Pattu
Divisional Secretariat put it, "Muslims don't keep statues. They keep trees because that's how it
looks like in Arabia. They have an Arabian culture.”246
That Allah may have turned up the heat in Kattankudy to ripen the dates has even further
implications for the cultivation of Muslimness in Kattankudy. The date trees in particular very
246

Manmunai Pattu Division Secretary, recollected from field notes, July 8, 2014.
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literally root Arabness and Muslimness into the soil of the town. At least some people like my
uncle mentioned above perceive the ripening of these dates as a type of divine validation for their
community, and Hizbullah also emphasizes the significance of this with his annual date harvest
functions. Thus these date trees--originally intended for "mere" beautification--contribute to the
validation of this local Sri Lankan space--and, indeed, the island itself--as "authentically"
Muslim. They act like an "Islamic" litmus test of the very soil in which they are planted, and
their fruits both confirm and embody the "Muslimness" of the land and community.
Technologies of Community
These projects have simultaneously reconstructed and constituted frames of community
conventions and expectations. Public beautification constructs community just as the community
(particularly politicians) constructs public beautification.Young writes that "once created,
memorials take on lives of their own, often stubbornly resistant to the state's original intentions.
In some cases, memorials created in the image of a state's ideals actually turn around to recast
these ideals in the memorial's own image."247 To push this further, in a similar analytic vein to
that of the previous chapter, Kattankudy's public beautification projects then negotiate this
"Arabness" trigonally in the local--somewhere in the liminal space between the local, the
transnational, and the oppositional/"othering." David Morgan describes a comparable process
with more theoretical sophistication:248
Public rites of piety remember the founding narratives that confer identity on the
community by tracing its story from origin to present. The monument or memorial statue
erected in the public square visually and spatially triangulates the viewer's relation to the
hero and the people for whom the hero dedicated himself in some sacrificial form. Heroes
are important to a social body because their presence allows a form of visibility otherwise
unarticulated. By seeing the hero, people see themselves as a people belonging to and
embodied in the hero. The totem is us.
247
248
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Morgan, The Embodied Eye, 25.
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As the often differing opinions and rumors indicate, the nature of community as mediated
through individual somatic bodies also means important polysemy within larger 'social bodies.'
In conceiving these public beautification projects as technologies of authenticity ornamenting the
land as community imaginary embodied and emplaced, it is of course important to keep in mind
that single politicians often create these projects for particular reasons. This has important
implications for the levels at which this sort of community rhetoric is salient, most directly the
upper-level elite ones. Prasanthan clearly seeks to appeal to his primary vote basis and majority
community of Tamil Saivite Hindus. There is ample evidence for this in the content of the
statues, the comments of my friends, and in the processions and rituals of the statue installation
ceremonies. However, as hinted at above in the discussion of the Catholic community's Stationsof-the-Cross procession and implied in the fact that Muslims are "encroaching" and building
mosques, Tamil Hindus are not the only 'community' in Araiyampathy though they are the strong
majority. As you travel south along the main road and pass Swami Vivekanada, you will
immediately see Masjid Salamaath on your left side and St. Mary's Church on your right. There
is also a small non-Catholic Christian community in Araiyampathy. Indeed, as mentioned above,
Tamil Hindus themselves have important divisions along political lines (ruling TMVP and
TNA). As a technology of community, the statues are then the technology of a very particular
community at the expense of others. As such, they help negotiate Araiyampathy's identity—and
the larger Manmunai Pattu District—as 'Tamil Hindu,' which aggravates land disputes. This also
lends credence to claims that Araiyampathy land is "Tamil" land when in fact Araiyampathy
village and the greater Manmunai Pattu have been home to Muslims and Christians for many
generations.
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In Kattankudy, there is perhaps a subtler process at work. Hizbullah's overall dream for
Kattankudy is to unify it on the basis of appeals to Muslimness in no small part because he is a
politician who benefits from rallying Kattankudy's diverse (Sufi-Tawheedi, to simplify)
population behind him and around the one thing they share: a perhaps vague/general Muslim
ethno-religious identity. Indeed, in addition to working to formally remove the fatwah against
Badhriya Jumma mosque, there are other rumors circulating about how Hizbullah has secretly
been helping the Sufi communities.249 An uninformed visitor might find it hard to believe that
such a town had been the site of systematic violent acts committed by so-called fellow
community members. The town has been ornamented with--apart from buildings with his name
on it--symbols of ostensibly 'Muslim' identity and large overarching street signs that seem to
visibly cohere and unify the town. As Thiranagama writes, "This Arabicized pedigree and image
has left a profound and contradictory legacy. Still potent and powerful as a representation of
Muslim difference and pedigree, acting to make the community cohere."250
Interestingly, while still affirming Kattankudy's beautification projects as icons of local
Muslim identity, Sufi groups are able to reclaim these icons and negotiate them within their own
communities. Take, for example, the use of these icons in a digitalized reconstruction by a
supporter coordinating the groups media outreach. It depicts Badhriya Jumma Mosque's leader
Rauf Moulavi for a large conference that he held at the mosque in October, 2015 in an attempt to
convene, unify, and rally Muslims against 'Wahhabi' influence. In fact, the poster includes the
title of his talk, "Sufis and Wahhabis," which brings to the forefront the contradiction that the
depictions of the beautification projects in the background thinly conceal. The group's main
249

One of these involved an elaborate and expensive scheme to pay a Sufi candidate who had been elected into
office to resign in exchange for donating 60 crore to help build Badhriya Jumma Mosque.
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Thiranagama, In My Mother’s House, 118. This paper has focused on the Muslim-Tamil relationship at the
expense of Sufi-Tawheedi relationships that are arguably more salient at present, yet not as clearly negotiated in
public beautification for precisely this reason that Thiranagama emphasizes.
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website and media unit put this image together along with the heading, "Sunnat Wal Jamaat
Conference [Happening] on Kattankudy's Soil 2014."251 Again, we find the emphasis on the soil
along with the date trees featured prominently in background (See Figure 18). They affirm and
embody a sacredness special to Kattankudy through not only premier madrasas, mosques and
other institutions, but now also 'indigenized' to the very soil. This underscores that, even as a
top-down technology of ornament, public beautification is highly polysemic and operates at
various levels amongst varying individuals.

Figure 19, Source: Shums Media Unit.
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“The Sunnat Wal Jamaat Ulema Conference Happening on Kattankudy Soil,” Shums Media Unit: Sufis, Sunnat
Wal Jamaat True Voice, http://www.shumsmedia.com/2014/11/2014_18.html. In the photo, the Basmallah
roundabout also has central importance and has been photoshopped for reasons as yet undetermined.
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A Conclusion: Constructing Ethnicity and Embodying Authenticity
I have contextualized materiality in everyday life in Kattankudy and Araiyampathy to illuminate
how these individuals and communities cultivate and embody ever-shifting and salient identities. I
therefore came to understand that people in these villages frequently negotiate many complicated
questions of identity and community through ornaments, both on their own bodies and on land that has
become embodiments of community imaginary. In this way, I attempted to illuminate—though by no
means resolve—a structure-agency debate concerning axioms of beauty and ornament.
With a broad conception of ‘public’ to include women as significant public actors, I argued that
this cultivation of self and society is in important ways achieved through technologies of ornament and
modalities of beauty. As Christopher Pinney puts it, "Rather than visual culture as a mirror of
conclusions established elsewhere, by other means, I try to present it as an experimental zone where new
possibilities and new identities are forged.195” The axiomatic technologies of ornament simultaneously
negotiate and constitute—embody—“cultural authenticity” such that analytic categories like
‘vernacular’ dissipate. Conceiving of the public as of fluid and shifting and modalities permits a more
vivid and dynamic and complicated conception of publics that includes a wide range of non-traditional
technologies like ornaments. I have also shown that, complicit with the embodiment of ornaments is, of
course, the salience of rumors that surround and shape these ornaments. With this understanding, I
have argued that ornamentation is a salient technology that people, especially though by no means
exclusively women, use to engage politically with questions of heritage, piety, and cultural authenticity.
I situated these very ground-level negotiations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Tamil’ ethnicity and culture
within a selective account of elite political debates in the British colonial period, a regional history of
252
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conflict and revival, and local origin narratives and land disputes. Particularly with respect to Muslim
identity, “frivolous” ornaments are extremely salient ways to express piety as well as to distinguish
Muslim ethnic heritage from that of Tamils, which Tamil nationalists have long argued is the same.
Additionally, in light of globalizing markets, networks of foreign aid, and transnational ‘revivalist’
movements, people use ornaments to establish real and imagined connections and appeals to foreign
agency and authenticity. Many people on the ground—and, indeed, many scholars—have overlooked
the nuances of these everyday negotiations and often label them as “Islamic” or as parts of processes of
“Arabization” and/or “Islamization.” In her field site in Tamil Nadu, Diane Mines also questions a
local/global dichotomy and describes how “regional and national social movements prove in many cases
to be a powerful set of contingent ideas and signs village residents draw upon to argue and contest the
social and spatial parameters of the village itself.”196 As a closer analysis of ornaments such as nail
polish and nose rings shows, “Muslimness” emerges as dialectical and triangulated—not to mention
plural and contested.
For many Muslims in this area, cultural authenticity is to a significant extent determined by what
is “not Tamil” and it is also mediated in local idioms. Similarly, as the ornamentation of spaces
illuminates, Tamilness becomes more and more what is not Muslim. In Kattankudy, many Muslims are
negotiating claims of “Arab” authenticity by adorning themselves with “Arab” ornaments yet still must
negotiate legitimate claims to the land that they live on in a tense post-war climate with threats of
Buddhist chauvinism on a national level and Tamil nationalism at a local and regional level. Public
beautification embodies this triangulation. In Kattankudy, it is (1) clearly inspired by and appealing to
the “Middle-East,”(2) operating through locally salient idioms of community, and (3) embodying a new
kind of Muslim authenticity that is ordained through fruiting date trees. The beautification projects in

253
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Araiyampathy highlight even more explicitly the embodiment of history, authenticity, and land and
show that these ornaments and “frivolous” political projects are real actors in community boundarymaking and imaginary-making.
In exploring ornament as a technology of cultural authenticity and of community that is
salient especially at boundaries, it also important to emphasize marginalized communities. This
thesis is obviously limited by many factors, but one important limitation has been the exploration
of minority communities—such as Catholics, non-Catholic Christians and especially the Sufi
Sunnat Wal Jamaat and Thareekathul Mufliheen communities—as well as individual
contestations and subversions of these idioms. I also had originally conceived of this these as
much larger than was feasible for this particular project. As a result, certain concepts here find
mention to illustrate complexity (particularly the mention of local Islams) but would ideally
eventually be fleshed out in future, perhaps in a separate work. Additionally, further
investigation of materials discussed here at their rumored origins (Saudi Arabia, etc.) is
warranted. This thesis has also privileged the ‘everyday’ and unconventional public modalities of
ornament, beauty, and rumor that are importantly accessible to more people. While this is
worthwhile in theory, a populist focus presents analytic challenges of scope that merits the
attention and refinement that may come with more data. This thesis is thus incomplete in itself,
but will serve as the foundation for future research.
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